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INTRODUCTION
Medicine concentrates on preventing viral infection through inoculation.
In inoculation, a tamed virus-a weakened, distorted, or dead variant-is
introduced to the body. As the body fights off this impotent impostor, it
develops antibodies that enable it to resist a future assault by the true virus.
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Cass Sunstein adopts the inoculation approach towards radical feminism.
Sunstein, perhaps unconsciously, recognizes the disruptive power of Catharine
MacKinnon's analysis of pornography, which not only expressly questions
male dominance and heterosexuality but also, implicitly, challenges mainstream
Constitutional legal scholarship and the academic status quo. Like a good
doctor, Sunstein introduces a tamed impostor theory, a "weak sister," to
invigorate masculinism so that it can virilely resist a virulently fatal disease.
In the name of embracing and explicating MacKinnon's critique of
pornography, Sunstein rewrites and distorts it in such a way as to leave only
a surface similarity, while excising its essential nature. A call for political and
sexual revolution becomes an anticrime, antismut bill. As such, variations on
MacKinnon's proposed antipornography legislation might be passed or
defeated' based on arguments having little to do with MacKinnon's founding
analysis. Meanwhile, the feminist critique underlying the original proposal will
lack virulence because society has been inured to it, has become tired of the
conversation. Sunstein tries to prevent radical feminism by introducing a
"neutered" feminism.
In this article I will argue first that Sunstein tries to "tame the shrew" by
inverting MacKinnon's analysis and fixating on relatively minor aspects of her
argument which might, in fact, be inconsistent with her main analysis. I start
by examining Sunstein's account of MacKinnon's theory of pornography
because his is an extremely eloquent expression of what I believe is a common
misreading of MacKinnon's views.2 It is also a misreading which I believe
MacKinnon actively promotes.3 And so, I am not accusing Sunstein of being
disingenuous in his interpretation. I presume that he sincerely wants to be
simultaneously both a feminist sympathizer and a good liberal working within
1. Although the Indiana and Minneapolis ordinances drafted by MacKinnon and Andrea Dworkin were
subsequently invalidated, antipornography bills that seek to eliminate the objectionable portions of the
ordinances were introduced in the 102d Congress and the Massachusetts legislature last year. See infra note
29.
2. It is a misreading accepted by many proponents of antipornography legislation of the type proposed
by MacKinnon and Andrea Dworkin. For example, Wisconsin State Senator Walter Chilsen, who sponsored
antipornography legislation in Wisconsin, stated that "[hiard-core pornography is what we're after....
[Miost issues of such magazines as Playboy, Penthouse, and Hustler would not be found obscene under
the bill." Janet Bass, Both Sides Air Views on Bill to Define Obscenity, UPI, Oct. 29, 1985, available in
LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File.
Even Drucilla Cornell focused her critique of MacKinnon's theory on the issue of physically violent
pornography. Cornell, however, explicitly states that the definition of pornography as sex plus violence
is Sunstein's, and not MacKinnon's. She defends her decision to use a definition substantially narrower
than MacKinnon's actual definition on the grounds that it is the more defensible position (in that it allows
for the protection of feminist artists who choose to deal in erotic themes). Drucilla Cornell, Sexual
Difference, the Feminine and Equivalency: A Critique of MacKinnon 's TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF
THE STATE, 100 YALE L.J. 2247, 2269 (1991) [hereinafter Cornell, Sexual Difference].
3. In her speeches in favor of the proposed legislation, MacKinnon often dwells on descriptions of
the most lurid violent pornography, and mentions in passing that more mainstream dirty books (such as
Playboy magazine) might also be covered by her legislation. See, e.g., Catharine A. MacKinnon,
Pornography as Defamation and Discrimination, 71 B.U. LAW REV. 793, 797 (1991) [hereinafter
MacKinnon, Defamation and Discrimination]. In other speeches, however, she is more candid about the
reach of her proposal. See, e.g., CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, 'More Than Simply a Magazine": Playboy's
Money, in FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DiscouRsEs ON LIFE AND LAW 134, 135-36 (1987).
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respectable, mainstream jurisprudence. Consequently, he is drawn to those
openings MacKinnon has placed in her work that allow her supposedly radical
"unmodified" feminism to be modified and domesticated.
Second, I will turn to MacKinnon's theory and argue that Sunstein might
have saved himself the effort. MacKinnon herself turns her back on the radical
transformative potential of her own insights and embraces a deeply reactionary
theory of the flesh-the very approach to sexuality which has been the
underpinning of American gender roles. What at first blush appears to be a
postmodern sociological theory,4 can be seen upon closer scrutiny to include
a modern liberal theory of the individual sutured onto a premodern Christian
concept of the body. MacKinnon's theory of pornography functions as a
necessary mechanism to link these three very different ways of thinking about
human nature. Her analysis of pornography ultimately devolves into a
conservative paean to the potency of masculinity as traditionally conceived.
Consequently, Sunstein did not need to modify MacKinnon's feminism to
inoculate masculinism against an epidemic of female emancipation because
MacKinnon's "feminism unmodified" turns out not to be as ravaging as
initially suspected. And so, ironically, even as I criticize Sunstein for
mischaracterizing MacKinnon's antipornography argument, I come very close
to agreeing with the bottom line of his argument purportedly in support of her
proposal: it probably won't make much difference.
I. SUNSTEIN'S PORNOGRAPHY ANALYSIS
A. Sexualized Violence
Sunstein's argument can be quite simply stated.5 We are all against
violence. Women are particularly subject to sexual violence in the forms of
4. What is or is not "postmodernist" is a matter of debate. I do not purport to develop a comprehensive
or noncontroversial definition of that term in this essay. When I say that MacKinnon's sociological approach
is seemingly "postmodern," I mean that it purports to be antiessentialist and antiobjective in its
concentration on the social construction of reality.
But is it postmodern? At least one writer has recently questioned whether "feminism [can] survive
the postmodern critique of reason." Dennis Patterson, Postmodernism/Feminism/Law, 77 CoRNELL L. REV.
254, 255 (1992). Patterson's choice of words is unfortunate-especially if you define feminism, as I do,
as the demand of women for dignity and membership in society. He is correct, however, in that many
contemporary legal feminists (including MacKinnon) have not yet internalized postmodern theory, although
they sometimes ostensibly adopt postmodern terminology.
In this essay I use the term "modern" to include political philosophies emphasizing reason and
individual autonomy starting from the various forms of liberalism during the Enlightenment, continuing
through Marxism, and into the twentieth century.
5. See Cass R. Sunstein, Feminism and Legal Theory, 101 HARv. L. REV. 826 (1988) (book review)
[hereinafter Sunstein, Legal Theory]. This book review of MacKinnon's FEMINISM UNMODIFIED starts with
a relatively accurate, although necessarily sketchy and underdeveloped, description of MacKinnon's
dominance thesis. Sunstein suggests that "MacKinnon's approach, because it expands and recasts the
prohibition on sex discrimination, is radically different from much of current law." Id. at 835. The balance
of the review, however, is an attempt to explicate, and I would say rewrite, MacKinnon's pornography
analysis.
1992]
Yale Journal of Law and Feminism [Vol. 5:123
rape, incest and sexually related torture and death.6 There is a growing body
of empirical evidence that violent pornography causes sexual violence. 7
Sunstein accurately identifies the difference between traditional obscenity law
and the MacKinnon/Dworkin antipornography proposal: the former
concentrates on the moral effect of obscenity on reader and society, while the
latter concentrates on the harmful effects of pornography on women." Sunstein
errs, however, in his narrow definition of the materials the proposal would
regulate and the harms it seeks to prevent. According to Sunstein, the
MacKinnon/Dworkin antipornography proposal makes "violent pornography"9
6. Sunstein describes MacKinnon's argument as follows:
First, she suggests that severe harms are done to women in the production of pornography and
that regulation of the resulting material is necessary to prevent those harms. Second, MacKinnon
contends that pornography has a causal connection to acts of sexual violence against women.
Third, and most generally, MacKinnon claims that pornography influences the attitudes of both
men and women in gender relations, attitudes that help produce unlawful discrimination and foster
gender inequality.
Id. at 841.
These statements are accurate in the sense that MacKinnon does, at times, state these views. See infra
notes 57-67 and accompanying text. However, as I will argue, they are misleading as presented. By
emphasizing physical violence in and of itself, rather than as an extreme and paradigmatic case of sexual
subordination, Sunstein inverts MacKinnon's analysis and priority. His tentative language that pornography
"influences" attitudes and "help[s] produce" discrimination and inequality does not give the sense of the
primacy pornography has in MacKinnon's theory. What is more, Sunstein describes the harm to be
combatted as "unlawful discrimination," when the radical feminist analysis concludes that the most
damaging form of discrimination against women is not only lawful, it is legally protected.
In another article defending antipornography legislation, Sunstein is more careful in identifying violent
pornography as his, rather than MacKinnon's, definition of pornography. Cass R. Sunstein, Pornography
and the First Amendment, 1986 DuKE L. J. 589, 592 [hereinafter Sunstein, Pornography].
7. "There is mounting evidence that sexual violence occurs both in and as a result of pornography.
Abuses within the pornography industry appear widespread. Considerable evidence from laboratory
experiments and the real world also suggests a link between pornography and sexual violence." Sunstein,
Legal Theory, supra note 5, at 843 (footnotes omitted). For discussions of studies supporting a relationship
between pornography and sexual violence, see Edward Donnerstein, Cheryl A. Champion, Cass R. Sunstein
& Catharine A. MacKinnon, Pornography: Social Science, Legal, and Clinical Perspectives4 LAW & INEQ.
J. 17 (1986).
Sunstein discusses both the various studies attempting to show a link between sexual violence and
pornography, and the problems with these studies, in Sunstein, Pornography, supra note 6, at 598-601.
He concludes that these studies are suggestive, yet far from dispositive. Indeed, in his attempt to present
honestly the weaknesses as well as the strengths of such studies, Sunstein (unintentionally, I'm sure) comes
close to suggesting that the expected effect of antipornography legislation is uncertain and at most, marginal.
He argues, however, that many of our laws (criminal as well as civil) are based on much less credible
evidence of causality.
8. Cass R. Sunstein, Neutrality in Constitutional Law (With Special Reference to Pornography,
Abortion and Surrogacy), 92 COLuM. L. REv. 1, 20-21 (1992) [hereinafter Sunstein, Neutrality].
9. "MacKinnon's principal application of the dominance approach is in the area of
pornography-defined not as sexually explicit materials but as those that associate sex with violence."
Sunstein, Legal Theory, supra note 5, at 840 (footnoted omitted). Also, after quoting the language of the
Dworkin-MacKinnon legislative proposal, Sunstein states that "[tihe ordinance is not aimed at sexually
explicit materials in themselves. Its principal target is sexually explicit materials that also involve violence,
either in their making or their use." Id. at 842.
Elsewhere, Sunstein ascribes to MacKinnon the view that pornography merges sex with violence:
On this view, the problem of pornography does not stem from offense, from free access to
sexually explicit materials, from an unregulated erotic life, or from the violation of community
standards. Instead, it is a result of tangible real-world harms, produced by the portrayal of women
and children as objects for the control and use of others, most prominently through sexual
violence.
Sunstein, Neutrality, supra note 8, at 20-21 (footnote omitted).
1992] Taming of the Shrew
actionable ° and seeks to prevent sexual violence against women.
Sunstein argues that the proposed legislation would not violate first
amendment freedom of speech. 1 The First Amendment should be read to
protect only high-level speech, such as political speech. 2 Pornography is not
political, it is sexy. 3 It appeals to the hormones not the head.' 4 It deeply
Further, he states that "under the antipornography approach [towards the regulation of sexually explicit
materials, as opposed to the obscenity approach], depictions of sexuality that involve rape and violence
against women may be subject to regulation, whereas depictions that do not are uncontrolled." Id. at 27.
Sunstein does admit that his definition limiting pornography to sexually explicit materials that sexualize
violence against women is somewhat narrower than the version in the MacKinnon/Dworkin ordinance
adopted by the City of Indianapolis, which also included the subordination of women as sexual objects.
Sunstein, Pornography, supra note 6, at 592.
10. Sunstein contrasts the Dworkin-MacKinnon pornography approach to sexually explicit materials
to the two dominant antiobscenity approaches, both of which he believes are based on a belief that sex is
"natural and neutral." Sunstein, Neutrality, supra note 8, at 19. The first, which he describes as "neo-
Freudian," opposes antiobscenity legislation because of a belief in the "need to liberate [sexual] drives from
the constraining arm of the state." The second, which he considers religiously based, accepts limited
antiobscenity legislation on the grounds that, although sex in the state of nature is pure, it can be polluted
by obscenity. Id.
This latter view may or may not be characteristic of contemporary American religious thinking. Insofar
as it purports to be a statement of the traditional Christian view of sexuality (the various sects of
Christianity still being the dominant religions in the United States), it is incorrect. As I have discussed
elsewhere, Jeanne L. Schroeder, Feminism Historicized: Medieval Misogynist Stereotypes in Contemporary
Feminist Jurisprudence, 75 IOWA L. REV. 1135 (1990) [hereinafter Schroeder, Feminism Historicizedl,
and as I will discuss more thoroughly below in the text accompanying notes 165-97, traditional Christian
theology hold that post-lapsarian human sexuality generally is the mark of our shame for Original Sin. The
permissible institutions for women's sexuality, in particular (i.e. marriage and legitimate motherhood) are
humiliating punishments for Eve's role in instigating the Fall. Consequently, MacKinnon's broadly inclusive
analysis of pornography (encompassing more than overtly violent pornography) is much more in keeping
with traditional religious principles than Sunstein's comparison implies.
11. Sunstein develops his Constitutional argument more fully in Sunstein, Pornography, supra note
6. The debate over whether the First Amendment can, or should, be interpreted as permitting or prohibiting
antipornography legislation is beyond the scope of this article. I refer to the arguments Sunstein and
MacKinnon make on this point solely insofar as they reveal their analyses of pornography. As Sunstein
cogently argues, the more one thinks that pornography is a serious issue, the less one is likely to think that
the slippery slope/line-drawing problem is insuperable, and vice versa. Sunstein, Pornography, supra note
6, at 626.
12. Distinctions among categories of speech in terms of their centrality to first amendment
purposes are well established in constitutional law, and a system of free expression could not
sensibly ignore them. For example, [various forms of speech] are regulable, largely because they
do not promote the purposes associated with free speech, which involve public deliberation,
broadly understood.
Sunstein, Legal Theory, supra note 5, at 844-45 (footnotes omitted). Sunstein identifies low-level speech
by four factors:
First, the speech must be far afield from the central concern of the First Amendment, which,
broadly speaking, is effective popular control of public affairs. Speech that concerns
governmental processes is entitled to the highest level of protection; speech that has little or
nothing to do with public affairs may be accorded less protection. Second, a distinction is drawn
between cognitive and noncognitive aspects of speech. Speech that has purely noncognitive appeal
will be entitled to less constitutional protection. Third, the purpose of the speaker is relevant:
if the speaker is seeking to communicate a message, he will be treated more favorably than if
he is not. Fourth, the various classes of low-value speech reflect judgments that in certain areas,
government is unlikely to be acting for constitutionally impermissible reasons or producing
constitutionally troublesome harms.
Sunstein, Pornography, supra note 6, at 603-604 (footnotes omitted).
13. Based on Sunstein's definitions, pornography does not qualify as high-level speech. "First, most
of the speech at issue is far afield from the central purposes of the first amendment under almost any view."
Sunstein, Legal Theory, supra note 5, at 844. Elsewhere Sunstein states: "The first point, made by
traditional obscenity law as well, is that much pornographic material lies far from the center of the First
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moves us to the depths of our hearts, in the pit of our stomachs, in the
involuntary twitching of our loins. It speaks to our sexual identities, our sense
of self and our relationship with others. That is, we care passionately about
pornography and what it shows so, by definition, it cannot be important.' 5
Amendment concern. We might think of the First Amendment as, generally, speaking and first and
foremost, a safeguard against government suppression of views with respect to public affairs." Sunstein,
Neutrality, supra note 8, at 22. Note that Sunstein's political/non-political distinction is expressly based
on the liberal public/private distinction, a distinction many feminists reject as one of the bulwarks of
masculinist legal discourse.
In a footnote to his Neutrality essay, Sunstein does raise the concern (also expressed by Judge
Easterbrook in American Booksellers Association, Inc. v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1985), aff'd,
475 U.S. 1001 (1985)) that "pornography affects social attitudes, and is in a deep sense political." He
denies, however, that it is "high level" or "political" speech. Sunstein, Neutrality, supra note 8, at 22 n.88.
Sunstein criticizes Judge Easterbrook for recognizing antipornography legislation as viewpoint-based,
without recognizing that traditional antiobscentity legislation standards is equally viewpoint-based. That
is, community standards of obscenity only seem neutral. Id. at 27. This point is well-taken, but might be
misdirected insofar as Judge Easterbrook merely struck down antipornography legislation and did not also
uphold obscenity legislation.
Sunstein attacks the Easterbrook challenge that the antipornography ordinance, which expressly viewed
pornography as communicating the ideology of male supremacy, is an impermissible viewpoint-based
restriction of speech (i.e. a form of thought control). Sunstein's first argument is that the fact that
pornography implicitly incorporates a political ideology does not transform it into an intentional political
statement which cannot be regulated, just as the fact that securities prospectuses implicitly incorporate a
free market political ideology does not make the Securities Act of 1933 unconstitutional. Second, not all
forms of viewpoint-based restrictions on speech are unconstitutional under current Supreme Court
precedents. See Sunstein, Pornography, supra note 6, at 613-15. "The harms of pornography, canvassed
above, are sufficient tojustify regulation under the standards applied to low level speech." Sunstein, Legal
Theory, supra note 5, at 845.
Sunstein tries to distinguish between speech which has political consequences-a category that would
include most forms of speech-and speech that is:
intended and received as a contribution to social deliberation.... Commercial speech, criminal
speech, and pornography do not qualify under this test. The argument to the contrary proceeds
by trading on an ambiguity in the word 'political.' It is unpersuasive because it uses the term
both as a statement about the social consequences of pornography (as to which it is quite
plausible) and as a statement about the notion of political in First Amendment law (as to which
it is quite implausible).
Sunstein, Neutrality, supra note 8, at 22 n.88. As discussed below in the text accompanying notes 116-17,
MacKinnon makes a second-level argument defending her statute against First Amendment attacks on the
ground of distinguishing pornography as a political act, rather than political speech. But, she hardly thinks
that the characterization of pornography as "political" is a non-serious trading over the ambiguity of the
term. Rather, it is political through and through, in the sense that radical feminism views sex as politics.
See infra note 35.
As discussed in notes 14-15 below, Sunstein does, at times, more carefully, and more (but not entirely)
successfully, describe the distinctions he is trying to make, between cognitive and non-cognitive speech.
14. Sunstein discusses both a political- nonpolitical distinction and a distinction between cognitive
and noncognitive speech. The former deserves protection as "speech" under the First Amendment, while
the latter may be more strictly regulated. He defines "cognitive" speech as "material [that] is intended to
or does in fact impart knowledge in any sense." Sunstein, Pornography, supra note 6, at 603 n.87 (relying
on John M. Finnis, "Reason and Passion": The Constitutional Dialectic of Free Speech and Obscenity,
116 U. PA. L. REV. 222, 227 (1960)). He notes that this distinction is similar to the current definition
of obscenity as lacking social utility. That is, obscenity, like pornography, is noncognitive because it appeals
to the realm of passion rather than to realm of intellect. Sunstein, Pornography, supra note 6, at 603.
15. Sunstein recognizes the power of this line of attack and admits that "distinctions between cognitive
and emotive aspects of speech are thin and in some respects pernicious." Sunstein, Pornography, supra
note 6, at 604. Much high-level symbolic speech, such as flag burning, appeals to the viscera. The
distinction he tries to make is based upon the intent of the speaker to communicate. Flag burning, for
instance, is intended not merely to raise our emotions, but also to cause us to re-examine our values and
beliefs. Id. at 604 n.94.
In contradistinction, even though pornography may have a sexual political effect, Sunstein believes
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But then why does Sunstein think pornography plays such a central role
in MacKinnon's theoretical and political writings? Sunstein notes that
MacKinnon herself does not analyze pornography in a vacuum, but
characterizes as "highly controversial" her claim "that pornography is [not]
a perversion of sexuality; it is instead that pornography helps to constitute
sexuality."16 He states that although MacKinnon's argument against
pornography "bears on sexuality quite generally,... it is possible to generate
a defense of antipornography legislation that does not go so deep."1" He states
that:
the critique of sexuality is distinct from the dominance approach
to sex discrimination, although in MacKinnon's formulation the
that its purveyors probably do not consciously intend to make a political statement. "The effect and intent
of pornography, as it is defined here, are to produce sexual arousal, not in any sense to affect the course
of self-government.. . . [Ilt is more akin to a sexual aid than a communicative expression." Id. at 606.
"A contention that the purpose of the speech is to transmit an ideological message is easily overborne by
the nature of the speech itself... . For pornography in particular, the cognitive element, to the extent that
there is one, operates at a subconscious level; the message is communicated indirectly." Id. at 608.
Insofar as his cognitive-noncognitive distinction, the second factor in his definition of low-level speech,
relates to the purpose of the speaker and whether or not that purpose is to make a political statement, it
overlaps significantly with his first and third factors. See supra note 14.
I presume that on this framework, insofar as Robert Mapplethorpe intended his sexually explicit
homoerotic photographs to appeal purely to our emotive, aesthetic and sensual aspects, regulation of his
works would be constitutionally permitted; but insofar as he intended to make a political comment such
regulation becomes more problematic. My presumption may be incorrect insofar as Sunstein sees the current
obscenity definition, which limits prohibitions to speech not having any "serious literary, artistic, political,
or scientific value" as being within his cognitive-noncognitive dichotomy. Sunstein, Pornography, supra
note 6, at 604 (emphasis added)(quoting Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973)). The distinction
between the passions triggered by art and those triggered by pornography must lie within Sunstein's private
theory of aesthetics.
16. Sunstein, Legal Theory, supra note 5, at 842. Elsewhere, when Sunstein purports to express his
own analysis rather than MacKinnon's, he states: "The goal of regulation of violent pornography is to
recognize that in some cases, sexual practices are a vehicle for sex discrimination, and to ensure that
materials that eroticize rape and other forms of violence are treated as a part of sex discrimination."
Sunstein, Neutrality, supra note 8, at 21. He ascribes to MacKinnon the view that "[a] fundamental point
• ..is that sexuality, as ordinarily practiced, is sometimes an ingredient in sexual inequality; the effort
to control violent pornography is intended in part to establish that point." Id. at 29, note 109 (emphasis
added).
In addition, elsewhere he does list as one of the harms of pornography (after abuse of pornographic
models and increasing the incidence of sex crimes) "harms to society through social conditioning that fosters
discrimination and other unlawful activities." Sunstein, Pornography, supra note 6, at 595. He does not
base his analysis primarily on this argument, however:
Pornography acts as a filter through which men and women perceive gender roles and
relationships between the sexes. Of course, pornography is only one of a number of conditioning
factors, and others are of greater importance. If pornography were abolished, sexual inequality
would hardly disappear. The connection between inequality, unlawful discrimination, and
pornography cannot be firmly established. But pornography undeniably reflects inequality, and
through its reinforcing power, helps to perpetuate it.
Id. at 601. Instead, he relies primarily on the connection between pornography and sexual violence, which
he describes as the "principal harms caused by pornography." Id. at 592. As discussed below, MacKinnon
sees the subordination of women as the principal harm, with sexualized violence only the most extreme
aspect of this oppression. See infra text accompanying notes 48-64.
Accordingly, in this article, Sunstein recognizes that his limitation of pornography to certain types
of sexually violent materials is slightly narrower than the MacKinnon definition. Sustein, Pornography,
supra note 6, at 592.
17. Sunstein, Legal Theory, supra note 5, at 846.
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two are merged. One might, for example, believe that issues
of sex discrimination should be approached in terms of
dominance rather than irrational differentiation without
believing that sexuality itself is the source of the problem."8
The way Sunstein distinguishes between generalized pornography analysis
and sexuality analysis and MacKinnon's dominance approach is by pointing
out:
First, the connections among sexuality, nature, law, and culture
are extraordinarily complex . . . Second, the relationship
between sex discrimination and sexual sadism is hardly simple
and clear cut. . . Moreover, sexual inequality is sometimes
rooted in things other than sexual sadism; economic, domestic,
and other advantages . . . . Third, the claim that sexuality is
based on male dominance is in some tension with the presence
of affirmative descriptions of sexuality from some women .
19
That is, Sunstein shows how masculinism can cross-dress in the trappings of
feminism by ostensibly adopting an antipornography position, and yet remain
virile.20
First, by concentrating on sexualized violence, and violence alone, Sunstein
has narrowed the scope of the proposed legislation so that it would leave
untouched "mainstream advertising, television, and popular culture-all of
which sexualize violence." 21 What is more, Sunstein argues that it might be
appropriate
to limit antipornography legislation so that it applies to work "taken
as a whole" or at the very least protects "isolated passages" in longer
works. . . . In such circumstances the low-value argument is more
difficult to make. . . . and such materials are less likely to have a
18. Id. at 847.
19. Id. at 847.
20. This is not the cross-dressing of drag queens, which seeks to be subversive of gender roles. Rather
it is in the tradition of Hasty Pudding revues, Monty Python, Charley's Aunt and the Pantomime Dame,
which reinstate gender roles. When we are expected to laugh at a man in a dress, using an obvious falsetto
voice, it is because the very possibility of transcending the sexual status quo is presented as ridiculous per
se.
21. Id. at 845. Elsewhere Sunstein states that antipornography legislation would involve "depictions
of sexuality that involve rape and violence against women... whereas depictions that do not" would not
be controlled. Sunstein, Neutrality, supra note 8, at 27. Once again, Sunstein could be describing the
antipornography legislation he might support, rather than the proposal made by Dworkin and MacKinnon.
Yet this is belied by the fact that this statement is made in connection with his analysis of the decision in
American Booksellers Assn. v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1985), aff'd, 475 U.S. 1001 (1985)), which
invalidated the Dworkin-MacKinnon proposal as adopted by the city of Indianapolis. It would seem,
therefore, that this is how he characterizes MacKinnon's definition of pornography.
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pernicious conditioning effect. They are thus less likely to produce
sexual violence.22
Second, Sunstein argues that pornography (as he narrowly defines it) is not
political,' and thus is not important. He thereby unintentionally undermines
one of the most fundamental feminist challenge to masculinism-that the
personal is the political.24 In the name of defending one specific feminist
legislative proposal, he risks trivializing the more general feminist critique.
This reestablishes and protects the traditional masculinist interpretation of the
Constitution.
Finally, he argues that an antipornography position can be divorced from
its initial justificatory theory (pornography constructs sex as domination) and
can be supported by an alternative justificatory theory (pornography, if defined
in a sufficiently limited way, might be causally related to physical violence
22. Sunstein, Pornography, supra note 6, at 624. MacKinnon has expressly rejected this approach.
Indeed, her critique of PLAYBOY magazine is precisely that it is designed to meet the "taken as a whole"
test of current obscenity law. CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, "More Than Simply A Magazine.- Playboy's
Money, in FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra note 3, at 134, 139.
23. Sunstein does recognize that Judge Easterbrook invalidated the Indianapolis antipornography
legislation as suppressing political speech. It would "constitute impermissible 'thought control,' since it
would 'establish an "approved" view of women, of how they may react to sexual encounters, [and] of how
the sexes may relate to each other.'" Sunstein, Neutrality, supra note 8, at 27 (quoting American
Booksellers Assn v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d at 328). Sunstein attacks this insistence on neutrality as
wrongheaded. The main thrust of his article is that sometimes in the area of sex discrimination the
government must take a seemingly partisan approach, as opposed to a facially neutral one. Sunstein,
Neutrality, supra note 8, at 29.
Once again the permissibility of antipornography legislation under the Constitution is beyond the scope
of this Article. The Supreme Court recently invalidated a law criminalizing "hate speech" as a violation
of the First Amendment. Justice Scalia's plurality opinion based the decision in large part on the fact that
the offending statute was not viewpoint neutral. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, Minnesota, 112 S.Ct. 2538
(1992). Although the opinion did not, of course, deal with antipornography legislation, there are hints in
the plurality opinion that suggest it too would be impermissible. For example, Scalia writes that "[tihe
proposition that a particular instance of speech can be proscribable on the basis of one feature (e.g.,
obscenity) but not on the basis of another (e.g., opposition to the city government) is commonplace, and
has found application in many contexts." Id. at 2544.
The question of whether the Constitution requires government to be neutral with respect to speech
or whether it in fact requires the government actively to promote certain partisan positions does not
undercut the argument that pornography is political. Rather, it sheds light on the argument that
antipornography legislation should be permitted despite its avowedly political nature.
MacKinnon does not defend her proposal on the grounds that pornography is not political in effect,
but rather on the grounds that it is not political speech. See infra text accompanying notes 116-117.
24. Sunstein states that "[iln some circles, moreover, the antipornography movement has served as
a powerful spur to changed attitudes on the part of both men and women." Sunstein, Legal Theory, supra
note 5, at 846. However, as I have stated and as I will develop more thoroughly, Sunstein rejects the
principle behind the antipornography movement: that pornography constructs sex, and that sex as so
constructed is a form of domination, so that pornography is intimately interconnected with the analysis of
the dominance theory of sexual discrimination. The attitudes he is discussing, presumably, refer to attitudes
related to his definition of pornography as violence.
At one point, Sunstein does partially recognize the issue of the legitimacy of the legal distinction
between the public and the private. He states that "[in this regard [that sexuality is sometimes a vehicle
for sex discrimination and violent pornography can be sex discrimination], the existing private sphere is
sometimes the problem rather than the solution. Legal controls aimed at pornography containing violence
against women, draw attention to and help counter that fact. They are permissible for that very reason."
Sunstein, Neutrality, supra note 8, at 21.
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against women).
B. Mechanics
It is initially hard to understand what Sunstein believes will be the result
of recognizing a right of action similar to that proposed by MacKinnon and
Dworkin. He states that "[i]t would be absurd to suggest that most sexual
violence is a result of pornography or that sexual violence would disappear if
pornography were eliminated."' He later states that "[tihe fact that control
of pornography would not bring about sexual equality by itself is hardly a
persuasive reason not to initiate a measure that might do considerable
good."26 Indeed, how could it be expected to have such an effect since, as
I have stated, according to Sunstein the proposal would not affect mainstream
cultural manifestations of sexualized violence? "Of course," he states, the
pornography industry is
more symptom than cause [of sex inequality]; but it is cause as well.
One need not believe that the elimination of violent pornography would
bring about sexual equality, eliminate sexual violence, or change social
attitudes in a fundamental way, in order to agree that a regulatory
effort would have some effect in reducing violence and in diminishing
views that contribute to existing inequalities.27
Having rejected the argument that the control of pornography would help
eliminate a substantial amount of sexual violence, or that it will be particularly
effective in eliminating inequality, and having rejected MacKinnon's analysis
of sexuality which underlies her analysis of pornography, what good does
Sunstein think controlling pornography would do?
Sunstein does not focus on how the Dworkin-MacKinnon proposal is
supposed to work, although I can guess by stopping here and examining its
mechanics. The direct effect Sunstein seems to expect from the anti-
pornography legislation he describes appears to be based on a traditional law
and economics argument typical of the University of Chicago.28 If sexual
25. Sunstein, Legal Theory, supra note 5, at 843.
26. Id. at 846.
27. Sunstein, Neutrality, supra note 8, at 25-26. Elsewhere he writes,
To say that there is such a connection [between violent pornography and sexual violence] is not
to say that pornography lies at the root of most sexual violence. Nor is it to say that most or even
a significant percentage of men will perpetrate acts of sexual violence as a result of exposure
to pornography. But it is to say that the existence of pornography increases the aggregate level
of sexual violence. Pornography is at least as much a symptom as a cause; but it is a cause as
well.
Sunstein, Pornography, supra note 6, at 597.
28. If Sunstein does not expressly set forth this economic efficiency argument, he does hint at it. He
states that one of the harms caused by the pornography industry is the coercion of models and actresses
into pornography, as well as the abuse and mistreatment of these women. Making pornography actionable
is, in Sunstein's opinion, preferable to the more restrictive alternative of making these acts criminal (as
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violence is causally related to pornography, then sexual violence can be
analyzed as an externality of the pornography industry. That is, part of the cost
of pornography (i.e. sexual violence) is born not by the producer or the
consumer but by third parties-its predominantly female victims. This results
in the production of a greater amount of sexual violence than our society
currently thinks is appropriate. The proposed antipornography legislation would
make pornographers internalize these costs by subjecting them to the risk of
suit. That is, the proposal does not purport to ban pornography or even to
subject it to direct government control. Rather, it establishes a cause of action
for damages (and, in some cases, injunctive relief) by certain persons injured
by the creation, sale, or use of, or trafficking in pornography.29 The risk of
being sued can be expected to increase the marginal cost to a pornographer
of producing an additional unit of violent pornography, thus shifting the supply
curve upwards. Assuming the demand curve for pornography to be relatively
elastic, the equilibrium point at which the supply and demand curves intersect
will shift to the northwest. That is, fewer units of pornography will be
they already are in current law) because "[tlhe only realistically effective way to eliminate the practice is
to eliminate or reduce the financial benefits." Sunstein, Neutrality, supra note 8, at 24.
Elsewhere he states, "[b]anning the unlawful conduct, however, is unlikely to eliminate it in light of
the enormous profits to be made from pornography and the difficulty and cost of ferreting out and punishing
particular abuses. The case for a ban on these materials depends on a conclusion that abusive practices are
widespread and that elimination of financial incentives is the only way to control those practices." Sunstein,
Pornography, supra note 6, at 596. Sunstein notes that such an economic analysis was adopted by the
Supreme Court in the case of child pornography in New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982). Sunstein,
Pornography, supra note 8, at 596; see also Sunstein, Neutrality, supra note 8, at 24.
29. See MINNEAPOLIS, MINN., ORDINANCE AMENDING tit. 7, chs. 139 and 141, MINNEAPOLIS CODE
OF ORDINANCES RELATED TO CIVIL RIGHTS (1983) and INDIANAPOLIS, IND., CrrY-CouNTY GENERAL
ORDINANCE 35 (1984) (adding, inter alia, ch. 16, § 16-3 (Q)(6) to the CODE OF INDIANAPOLIS AND
MARION COUNTY).
More recent attempts to pass antipornography legislation narrow the scope of actionable behavior.
For example, legislation proposed in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, which contains a definition of
pornography similar to that used in the Minneapolis and Indianapolis, would not make trafficking in
pornography actionable. Mass. House Bill No. 5194, 1992.
A bill considered in the U.S. Senate last year would have permitted the victim of a rape, sexual assault
or sexual crime to bring a civil action against a producer, distributor, exhibitor or seller of sexually explicit
material if, among other elements, the material was a proximate cause of the offense. The definition of
sexually explicit materials was significantly different from the MacKinnon proposal in that it concentrated
on the depiction of specific physical acts (i.e. sexual intercourse, bestiality, lascivious exhibition of the
genitals, sadistic or masochistic abuse, etc.) and did not specifically mention the hierarchial aspects of
MacKinnon's definition of pornography (i.e. depictions of women as submissive and servile, etc.). The
preamble of the bill emphasized the relationship between pornography and sexual aggression, child abuse
and serial murderers and the psychological injury caused by child abuse but did not mention any relationship
between pornography and the subordination of women generally. Reflecting the traditional "taken as a
whole approach" of obscenity jurisprudence, material would not be considered sexually explicit if the
offending description were an isolated passage in material not otherwise sexually explicit. The issue of
whether the material was violent or promoted violent sexual behavior would be relevant for the purposes
of establishing proximate cause. The definition of violence was more in keeping with the spirit of the
MacKinnon proposal in that it includes depictions of victims "tortured, dismembered, confined, bound,
beaten, or injured, in a context that makes these experiences sexual or indicates that the victims derive
sexual pleasure from such experiences." S. 983, 102d. Cong., 1st. Sess. (1991).
A bill before the U.S. House of Representatives was much narrower, only covering one aspect of the
creation of visual (but not written) pornography-the coercion, intimidation or fraudulent inducement of
an individual to engage in sexually explicit conduct for the purpose of producing any visual depiction of
such conduct to be transported in interstate commerce. H.R. 1768, 102d. Cong., 1st Sess. (1991).
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produced and consumed at any given price. The lowered production of violent
pornography should be expected to result in a lower level of sexual violence.
This should be true even if violent pornography is not the sole cause, or even
the primary cause, of sexual violence so long as there is some causal linkage.
The result of internalizing the costs (i.e. insuring that the supplier bears
the total cost of production) will enable the sexual economy more efficiently
to determine the optimum mix of sexual titillation and sexual violence, while
leaving (as Sunstein implicitly, but probably not consciously, suggests) the
system of male domination and female subordination largely intact.30
On the other hand, if the demand curve for violent pornography is
inelastic-if consumers will still consume it even at a higher price-then
Sunstein's proposal will have little effect on the amount of pornography
produced or on the amount of violence perpetrated on women. However, men
who read violent pornography will be forced to pay a premium for the
privilege of violence. Hence, given an inelastic demand curve, violence is
commodified and becomes the subject of market exchange.
However, if the causal connection between pornography and violence is
weak (as Sunstein suggests), and since the screening costs of distinguishing
between violent and non-violent consumers of violent pornography are
impossibly high, both violent and non-violent consumers will pay a greater
price for the privilege of consuming violent pornography. That is, the entire
costs of violent pornography will not be internalized by the violent consumers,
but will be spread over all consumers. This means that non-violent consumers
of violent pornography will subsidize the violence of the other, violent,
consumers.
C. Net Effect
The answer to the question of how Sunstein thinks masculinism can easily
and safely adopt antipornography should by now be obvious. Sunstein has
defined away pornography to an almost infinitesimally narrow epiphenomenon.
He then relates it causally to acts almost universally recognized as heinous and
seriously criminal: violent stranger rape, forced bestiality, torture and murder.
30. Insofar as the definition of actionable pornography is very narrowly defined (being much narrower
than the definition of obscenity and permitting violent pornographic interludes in works which, taken as
a whole, are not violently pornographic), the total increase in the costs to pornographers, and the resulting
decrease in the production of violent pornography, can be expected to be small. Whether or not the increase
will materially affect the consumption of violent pornography will depend on the price elasticity of the
demand for violent pornography-that is, if the demand curve for pornography is elastic, the increase in
price can be expected to substantially decrease consumption, but if the demand curve for pornography is
relatively inelastic, an increase in price will have a relatively minor effect upon consumption. In turn,
whether or not any decrease in the consumption of violent pornography will have a material effect on the
amount of sexual violence against women will depend on the strength of the causal link between the former
and the latter. In other words, although the question is an empirical one, under this analysis the effect which
antipornography legislation can be expected to have on sexual violence is uncertain but would probably
be extremely marginal.
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What is more, he denies its material relation to the fundamental structures of
sexual dominance. Finally, he suggests that eliminating pornography probably
will not have any significant effect even on sexualized violence. Consequently,
masculinism can permit pornography to be actionable because: i) it would at
most make certain categories of sexual esoterica somewhat more expensive,
and this inconvenience can be justified by reference to the prevention of acts
which are already considered serious crimes; ii) it would not have any effect
on the sexual status quo of male dominance; and, perhaps most importantly,
iii) it won't really prevent rape anyway. That is, give the girls their statute-it
won't make any difference. We can convince ourselves that we honestly and
vigorously support feminism without risking our status as liberal, legal
academicians. We can recognize that women are oppressed without having to
question, as MacKinnon does, the very nature of masculine sexuality.
And so Sunstein introduces us to an accurate description of MacKinnon's
theory but then subtly distorts it. He emphasizes the non-controversial
aspects-its opposition to smut and violence as traditionally conceived-while
de-emphasizing its disturbing aspects-the analysis of the masculinist
construction of sex as domination. But, being too careful and honest a scholar
to ignore the latter totally, he argues that one can accept the former without
the latter. In doing so he is, perhaps, only gratefully accepting an invitation
which MacKinnon herself has graciously extended-Sunstein's interpretation
is, after all, scrupulously based on her text. He thereby introduces into
masculinism a weakened and non-fatal modification of feminism which retains
the form of the virus, but which does not contain its virulent, radical, and vital
driving force. Consequently, he can conclude: "My suspicion ...is that a
decade from now, the central insights of Feminism Unmodified, and of
MacKinnon's work generally, will be taken as substantially correct in the legal
culture. If they are not, the fault will lie with the legal culture, not with the
insights themselves.""' If Sunstein is successful, masculinist legal culture will
have internalized the weakened form of feminism which he has introduced.
Having been inoculated against the stronger form, the masculinist legal culture
will remain. If the stronger form of feminism is successfully resisted by legal
culture it will be because of the strength of inoculated masculinism, rather than
merely the innate weakness of feminism.
II. MACKINNON'S PORNOGRAPHY ANALYSIS
A. Sex, Not Violence
Catharine MacKinnon's central analysis of pornography is a critique of
sexuality, not violence, violent sex or sexualized violence.32 In a passage that
31. Sunstein, Legal Theory, supra note 5, at 848.
32. MacKinnon insists that so-called sexual violence, or violent sex, must be analyzed, first and
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could have been addressed directly to Sunstein, she states:
To define the pornographic as that which is violent, not sexual, as
liberal moral analyses tend to, is to trivialize and evade the essence of
this critique, while seeming to express it. As with rape, where the issue
is not the presence or absence of force but what sex is as distinct from
coercion, the question for pornography is what eroticism is as distinct
from the subordination of women. This is not a rhetorical question.
Under male dominance, whatever sexually arouses a man is sex. In
pornography the violence is the sex. The inequality is the sex.
Pornography does not work sexually without hierarchy. If there is no
inequality, no violation, no dominance, no force, there is no sexual
arousal.33
Sexuality, to MacKinnon, is not a matter of biology,34 but of politics:35
foremost, as examples of sex. This is not because she trivializes the violence in these incidents or because
she does not recognize that rape is worse when the woman is killed or physically tortured, rather than
"merely" psychologically injured. She argues that scholars (such as Sunstein) emphasize the violent aspect
of sexual violence in order to distinguish rape from "normal" heterosexual intercourse and, thereby, to
insulate gender hierarchy from criticism. As I will explain more fully below, she calls for an analysis of
rape and pornography as part of a continuum of "normal" sex. Lying at the extremity of this spectrum,
they serve as exemplars, as epitomes, of sex. See infra notes 57-58.
33. CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, Not a Moral Issue, in FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra note 3, at
146, 160 (footnote omitted). Elsewhere, MacKinnon continues: "In pornography, the violence is the sex.
The inequality is sex. The humiliation is sex. The debasement is sex. The intrusion is sex. Pornography
does not work sexually without gender hierarchy. If there is no inequality, no violation, no dominance,
no force, there is no sexual arousal." CATHARINE A. MAcKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE
STATE 211 (1989) [hereinafter MACKINNON, THEORY OF THE STATE).
Discussing the presumptions underlying studies that attempt to show that there is no causal link
between pornography and violence, and that do not consider sex as violence, MacKinnon states: "They
don't ask whether sexuality is itself violating or even whether it is itself violent; they are premised instead
on the view that sexuality and violence are distinct; hence pornography is distinct from erotica .... But
they don't test for whether sexual excitement means they will express violent sex . . . ." CATHARINE A.
MACKINNON, Linda's Life and Andrea's Work, in FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra note 3, at 127, 130.
MacKinnon argues that pornography tends to increase the physically violent aspect of heterosexuality,
as well as the demand for more violent forms of pornography. "[Tihe more pornography men see, the more
abusive and violent they want it to be. The more abusive and violent it becomes, the more they enjoy it
and the more aroused they get. The more abusive and violent it becomes, the less harm they see in what
they are seeing and doing." MacKinnon, Defamation and Discrimination, supra note 3, at 799.
34. "If this differential [between the sexes] were biological, maybe biological intervention would have
to be considered. If it were evolutionary, perhaps men would have to evolve differently. Because I think
it is political, I think its politics construct the deep structure of society." CATHARINE A. MACKINNON,
Difference and Dominance: On Sex Discrimination, in FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra note 3, at 32, 41.
See id. at 52, ("the analysis of sex is social, not biological."); see also MACKINNON, THEORY OF THE
STATE, SUpra note 33, at xiii, 57.
35. "Gender is an inequality of power, a social status based on who is permitted to do what to
whom." CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, The Art of the Impossible, in FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra note
3, at 1, 8. MacKinnon elaborates on this point, explaining that "[bly political, I mean here questions of
power. The feminist theory of power is that sexuality is gendered as gender is sexualized .... In other
words, feminism is a theory of how the erotization of dominance and submission creates gender, creates
woman and man in the social form in which we know them." CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, Desire and
Power, in FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra note 3, at 46, 50 (footnote omitted).
Thus, "Itio explain gender inequality in terms of 'sexual politics' is to advance not only a political
theory of the sexual that defines gender but also a sexual theory of the political to which gender is
fundamental." MACKINNON, THEORY OF THE STATE, supra note 33, at 131 (footnote omitted). See also
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[M]en's power to make the world here is their power to make us make
the world of their sexual interaction with us they way they want it..
. .Now I want to say something about the use of the verb "to be" in
feminist theory. If the analysis I have given is right, to be realistic
about sexuality socially is to see it from the male point of view....
Because male power has created in reality the world to which feminist
insights, when they are accurate, refer, many of our statements will
capture that reality, simply exposing it as specifically male for the first
time. For example, men say all women are whores. We say men have
the power to make this our fundamental condition. So feminism stresses
the indistinguishability of prostitution, marriage, and sexual harassment.
See: what a woman "is" is what you have made women "be." That
"is" women, as men make women mean. They have the power to; they
do-otherwise power means nothing.36
That is, in what appears to be typical postmodernist social theory, MacKinnon
insists that there is no "reality" external to human society, there are only social
constructs. She also takes the corollary of this seriously and literally. What
society constructs is "real" not in an objectivist and essentialist matter, but in
the sense that this is the only meaning which the word "real" can have in a
postmodern world." In addition, actual empirical women "really" live their
lives in accordance with this constructed reality. Rape is real, not a false
charge.3" She has described her project in part as asking not only what is
id. at xiii, 3, 41, 113, 242; and generally, id. 215-234.
36. CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, Desire and Power, in FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra note 3, at
46, 58-59 (footnotes omitted).
MacKinnon often emphasizes the way in which men construct sexual reality. "Male dominance here
is not an artificial overlay upon an underlying inalterable substratum of uncorrupted essential sexual being.
... Pornography is not imagery in some relation to a reality elsewhere constructed. It is not a distortion,
reflection, projection, expression, fantasy, representation or symbol either. It is sexual reality." CATHARINE
A. MACKINNON, Not a Moral Issue, in FEMN1SM UNMODIFIED, supra note 3, at 146, 149.
Because male power creates the reality of the world to which feminist insights, when accurate,
refer, feminist theory will simply capture that reality but expose it as specifically male for the
first time. For example, men say all women are whores; feminism observes that men have the
power to make prostitution women's definitive condition. Men define women as sexual beings;
feminism comprehends that femininity is sexual. Men see rape as intercourse; feminism observes
that men make much intercourse rape. Men say women desire to be degraded; feminism sees
female masochism as the ultimate success of male supremacy and puzzle (and marvel) over its
failures. The feminist use of the verb "to be" is this kind of "is."
MACKINNON, THEORY OF THE STATE, supra note 33, at 125 (footnote omitted). "Male power is a myth
that makes itself true." Id. at 104.
37. "Then there are the interpretation people, for whom social reality has no fixed, determinate
reality. Society is all mental. Pornography, too, is just a fantasy. But if it is only mental, in a world in
which everything is only mental, why isn't it as real as anything else?" CATHARINE A. MAcKINNON,
Afterword, in FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra note 3, at 215, 223.
38. Feminist theory "participates in reality: the reality of a fist in the face, not the concept of a fist
in the face." Catharine A. MacKinnon, Reflectionson SexEquality UnderLaw, 100 YALE L. J. 1281, 1285
(1991) [hereinafter MacKinnon, Reflections].
The facts have to do with the rate of rape and attempted rape of American women, which is 44
percent. If you ask a random group of women, "Have you ever been raped or been the victim
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constructed, but who is doing the constructing. 9 As human beings are all
constructed, we can only experience sex in terms of how specific societies
organize sexual relationships' and the status attributed to sexual identities.4'
That is, whether or not there could be a theoretical distinction between purely
biological sex and social gender, such a distinction is at best meaningless as
a practical political matter, and at worst, misleading in that it gives an aura
of naturalism to the status quo.
42
of an attempted rape?" and do not exclude marital rape, that is the figure. Some 4.5% percent
of all women are victims of incest by their fathers, an additional 12 percent by other male family
members, rising to a total of 43 percent of all girls before they reach the age of eighteen, if
sexual abuse within and outside the family is included. These data, by the way, are predicated
on believing women, which Freud had a problem with .... If you ask women whether they've
been sexually harassed in the last two years, about 15 percent report very serious or physical
assaults; about 85 percent of all working women report sexual harassment at some time in their
working lives. Between a quarter and a third of all women are battered by men in the family.
If you look at homicide data, between 60 percent and 70 percent of murdered women have been
killed by a husband, lover, or ex-lover. The same is not true for murdered men.... About 12
percent of American women are or have been prostitutes .... The pornography industry, an
exemplary synthesis of the erotization of dominance and submission with capitalism's profit
motive, is put at eight billion dollars a year, with three to four times as many outlets as
McDonald's restaurants.
CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, Desire and Power, in FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra note 3, at 46, 51-52.
39. "Post-Lacan, actually post-Foucault, it has become customary to affirm that sexuality is socially
constructed. Seldom specified is what, socially, it is constructed of, far less who does the constructing or
how, when, or where." MACKINNON, THEORY OF THE STATE, supra note 33, at 131 (footnote omitted).
As I will explain below, the questions "who" is doing the constructing and "of what" is sexuality
constructed, presuppose a liberal essentialist theory of the subject and the body that was expressly rejected
by Foucault and Lacan. "How?," "when?," and "where?" are hardly unasked questions. See infra text
accompanying notes 206-229. One can disagree as to their success, but Foucault and Lacan's works
revolved primarily on proposing answers for these questions.
40. That is, even if pornography is a fantasy, human beings live their lives in accordance with this
fantasy. Fantasy is, therefore, reality. "Pornography is not imagery in some relation to a reality elsewhere
constructed. It is not a distortion, reflection, projection, expression, fantasy, representation, or symbol
either. It is sexual reality.... Gender is what gender means." MACKINNON, THEORY OF THE STATE,
supra note 33, at 198 (footnote omitted). "Women live in the world pornography creates, live its lie as
reality." Id. at 205. "Pornography can invent women because it has the power to make its vision into
reality, which then passes, objectively, for truth." Id. at 205.
See also CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, Not a Moral Issue, in FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra note 3,
at 146, 148-55 and CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, Francis Biddle's Sister, in FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra
note 3, at 163, 171-73. "The experience of the (overwhelmingly) male audiences who consume pornography
is therefore not fantasy or simulation or catharsis but sexual reality: the level of reality on which sex itself
largely operates." MACKINNON, THEORY OF THE STATE, supra note 33, at 198 (footnote omitted).
See also supra note 39. "I define sexuality as whatever a given society eroticizes. That is, sexual is
what sexual means in a particular society. Sexuality is what sexuality means." CATHARINE A. MACKINNON,
Desire and Power, in FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra note 3, at 46, 53.
41. "Because sexuality arises in relations under male dominance, women are not the principal authors
of its meanings. In the society we currently live in, the content I want to claim for sexuality is the gaze
that constructs women as objects for male pleasure." CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, Desire and Power, in
FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra note 3, at 46, 53. "I think that sexual desire in women, at least in this
culture, is socially constructed as that by which we come to want our own self-annihilation." Id. at 54.
"A theory of sexuality becomes feminist methodologically, meaning feminist in the post-marxist sense,
to the extent it treats sexuality as a social construct of male power: defined by men, forced on women,
and constitutive of the meaning of gender." MACKINNON, THEORY OF THE STATE, supra note 33, at 128.
42. Critiquing the strand of feminist theory according to which gender inequality revolves around
gender differentiation, MacKinnon states:
The view is that there are real differences between the sexes, usually biological or natural. Upon
these differences, society has created some distorted, inaccurate, irrational, and arbitrary
distinctions: sex stereotypes or sex roles. To eliminate sex inequality, in this view, is to eliminate
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MacKinnon's approach is that, in order to understand the norm, one should
look at the exception.43 The exception should not be seen as an aberration
in the sense of a break from the norm, but as a continuation and exaggeration
of the norm." Extreme behavior clears out the underbrush and leaves the
these wrong and irrational distinctions. The evil and dynamic of sexism here is the twisting of
biological males and females into masculine and feminine sex roles.
CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, Women, Self-Possession, and Sport, in FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra note
3, at 117, 117. "That is, the equality of women to men will not be scientifically provable until it is no
longer necessary to do so." MACKINNON, THEORY OF THE STATE, supra note 33, at 117.
As I have argued elsewhere, MacKinnon's approach has great superficial similarities to the
psychoanalytic theory of sexuality associated with Jacques Lacan. Lacanians also do not generally
distinguish between gender and sexuality because, they claim, our conscious selves can only experience
our anatomical reality mediated through language and the unconscious. See Jeanne L. Schroeder, That
Obscure Object of Desire: Property and the Feminine in Law and Psychoanalysis (Oct. 15, 1992)
(unpublished manuscript on file with author); Jeanne L. Schroeder, Subject:Object, 47 MIAMI L. REV.
(forthcoming 1992) [hereinafter Schroeder, Subject.Object].
43. To this extent, MacKinnon's approach, with which I largely agree, may be compared to the
approach of Carl Schmitt. Schmitt turns Thomas Hobbes on his head by arguing that one can best
understand the political concept of sovereignty not by looking at government in normal times, but at crisis.
"Sovereign is he who decides on the exception." CARL SCHMIr, POLITICAL THEOLOGY: FoUR CHAPTERS
ON THE CONCEPT OF SOVEREIGNTY 5 (George Schwab trans., 1985).
44. "In a feminist perspective, pornography is the essence of a sexist order, its quintessential social
act." CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, Not a Moral Issue, in FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra note 3, at 146,
154.
[Wihatever goes on in the minds of women hurt through pornography, or even all women, who
live knowing what will, sooner or later, happen to them, and then it happens-that is trivial and
does not matter at all. Understand, these are people who claim to understand what Derrida means
when he says that speech is "always already" writing, but claim not to be able to grasp how
sexuality could be always already pornography.
CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, Afterword, in FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra note 3, at 215, 223.
This is why MacKinnon insists that one cannot draw a line between erotica and pornography, rape
and intercourse, sexual violence and sexual hierarchy. For example, in Linda's Life and Andrea's Work,
MacKinnon states,
Pornography is thought to be a divergent and unorthodox view. Andrea [Dworkin]'s analysis
reveals that the views in pornography are conventional; they are the consensus. This is why legal
line-drawing is so difficult in this area. That difficulty was implicit in all Mr. Joseph said to make
us afraid of the consequences of trying to do anything about pornography: the inability to draw
a line between pornography and everything else. To me that exposes the pervasiveness of the
value system Andrea analyzes, its presence in literature, in advertising, in daily life. If I have
any difficulty distinguishing those areas from pornography, it is not because I don't think some
things are worse than others, because they are, but because the same values pervade them all.
CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, Linda's Life and Andrea's Work, in FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra note 3,
at 127, 130-31.
Additionally, in Sex and Violence: A Perspective, MacKinnon notes,
The point of view of men up to this time, called objective, has been to distinguish sharply
between rape on the one hand and intercourse on the other; sexual harassment on the one hand
and normal, ordinary sexual initiation on the other; pornography or obscenity on the one hand
and eroticism on the other. The male point of view defines them by distinction. What women
experience does not so clearly distinguish the normal, everyday things from those abuses from
which they have been defined by distinction.... What we are saying is that sexuality in exactly
these normal forms often does violate us. So long as we say that those things are abuses of
violence, not sex, we fail to criticize what has been made of sex, what has been done to us
through sex, because we leave the line between rape and intercourse, sexual harassment and sex
roles, pornography and eroticism, right where it is.
CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, Sex and Violence, in FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra note 3, at 85, 86-87.
Furthermore:
Whatever obscenity may do, pornography converges with more conventionally acceptable
depictions and descriptions just as rape converges with intercourse because both express the same
power relation. Just as it is difficult to distinguish literature or art against a background, a
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characteristic elements of society bare to be seen. Like a caricature, it
exaggerates features in a way as to make them more easily recognizable.
Consequently, in order to analyze the political nature of sex, we need to look
at our society's starkest and most undiluted depictions of sex, i.e.,
pornography. Pornography describes sex as sex; not sex as art, sex as love,
sex as violence or sex as anything else.45 What pornography depicts is the
subordination of women by men.' That is, to MacKinnon, not only is the
standard, of objectification, it is difficult to discern sexual freedom against a background, a
standard, of sexual coercion.
CATHARINE A. MAcKINNON, Not a Moral issue, in FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra note 3, at 146, 154.
45. In pornography, there it is, in one place, all of the abuses that women had to struggle so long even
to begin to articulate, all the unspeakable abuse: the rape, the battery, the sexual harassment,
the prostitution, and the sexual abuse of children. Only in the pornography it is called something
else: sex, sex, sex, sex, and sex, respectively. Pornography sexualizes rape, battery, sexual
harassment, prostitution, and child sexual abuse; it thereby celebrates, promotes, authorizes, and
legitimizes them. More generally, it eroticizes the dominance and submission that is the dynamic
common to them all. It makes hierarchy sexy and calls that "the truth about sex" or just a mirror
of reality.
CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, Francis Biddle 's Sister: Pornography, Civil Rights, and Speech, in FEMINISM
UNMODIFIED, supra note 3, at 163, 171 (footnote omitted).
As to gender, what is sexual about pornography is what is unequal about social life. To say that
pornography sexualizes gender and genders sexuality means that it provides a concrete social
process through which gender and sexuality become functions of each other. Gender and
sexuality, in this view, become two different shapes taken by the single social equation of male
with dominance and female with submission. . . . Inequality is what is sexualized through
pornography; it is what is sexual about it. The more unequal, the more sexual. The violence
against women in pornography is an expression of gender hierarchy, the extremity of the
hierarchy expressed and created through the extremity of the abuse, producing the extremity of
the male sexual response.
MAcKINNON, THEORY OF THE STATE, supra note 33, at 143-44.
"When men use pornography, they experience in their bodies, not just their minds, that one-sided
sex-sex between a person (them) and a thing (it)-is sex, that sexual use is sex, sexual abuse is sex, sexual
domination is sex. . . . Pornography works by making sexism sexy." MacKinnon, Defamation and
Discrimination, supra note 3, at 802.
MacKinnon similarly looks at rape as an exemplar, not an aberration, of normal sex. In THEORY OF
THE STATE, MacKinnon states: "Politically speaking, whatever obscenity may do, pornography converges
with more conventionally acceptable depictions and descriptions just as rape does with intercourse, because
both are acts within the same power relation." MACKINNON, THEORY OF THE STATE, supra note 33, at
203.
If sexuality is central to women's definition and forced sex is central to sexuality, rape is
indigenous, not exceptional, to women's social condition. In feminist analysis, a rape is not an
isolated event or moral transgression or individual interchange gone wrong but an act of terrorism
and torture within a systematic context of group subjection, like lynching.
Id. at 172. "Here the victims' perspective grasps what liberalism applied to women denies: that forced
sex as sexuality is not exceptional in relations between the sexes but constitutes the social meaning of
gender." Id. at 178. Consequently, MacKinnon calls for the recognition of a civil cause of action for rape
as an act of sexual discrimination. Catharine A. MacKinnon, The Palm Beach Hanging, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
15, 1991, § 4, at 15.
46. That is, men possessing women, as Andrea Dworkin describes pornography in the title of her
book. ANDREA DwoRKIN, PORNOGRAPHY: MEN POSSESSING WOMEN (1981). In other words,
"pornographic meaning that the woman is defined as to be acted upon, a sexual object, a sexual thing-the
viewing is an act, an act of male supremacy." CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, Linda's Life and Andrea's
Work, in FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra note 3, at 127, 130.
"In pornography, women desire dispossession and cruelty. . . . Subjection itself, with self-
determination ecstatically relinquished, is the content of women's sexual desire and desirability. Women
are there to be violated and possessed, men to violate and possess them . . ." Id. at 148.
Pornography, in the feminist view, is a form of forced sex, a practice of sexual politics, an
institution of gender inequality. In this perspective, pornography, with the rape and prostitution
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subordination of women sexual, but sexuality is the subordination of
women.
47
The harm of pornography, first and foremost, is that it is one of the
primary vehicles by which sexuality is constructed.48 Specifically, in
masculinist society, sexuality does not exist separate from the gender
hierarchy, it is the gender hierarchy.49 Pornography is the eroticization of
domination and submission.5" In pornography, woman's sexuality is her
violation: to be a woman is to be rapable.5" Pornography is, therefore, one
of the primary bases of sexual discrimination, of sexual inequality. It is, in this
sense, a "form of forced sex."5 2 Pornography is itself always already a form
of violence: a violent act.53
MacKinnon also argues that pornography has a causal link to sexualized
violent (or, perhaps more accurately, violently sexual, or just sexual) acts
in which it participates, institutionalizes the sexuality of male supremacy, which fuses the
erotization of dominance and submission with the social construction of male and female.
MACKINNON, THEORY OF THE STATE, supra note 33, at 197 (footnote omitted).
47. Force is sex, not just sexualized; force is the desire dynamic, not just a response to the
desired object when desire's expression is frustrated. Pressure, gender socialization, withholding
benefits, extending indulgences, the how-to books, the sex therapy are the soft end; the fuck,
the fist, the street, the chains, the poverty are the hard end.
MACKINNON, THEORY OF THE STATE, supra note 33, at 136.
48. "Pornography, which sexualizes gender inequality, is a major institution of socialization into these
roles. The evidence suggests that women are targeted for intimate assault because the degradation and
violation and domination of women is eroticized, indeed defines the social meaning of female sexuality
in societies of sex inequality." MacKinnon, Reflections, supra note 38, at 1302-03. "Pornography has a
central role in actualizing this system of subordination in the contemporary West." MacKinnon, Defamation
and Discrimination, supra note 3, at 796.
See also MacKinnon, Not a Moral Issue, in FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra note 3, at 146, and
MacKinnon, Francis Biddle's Sister: Pornography, Civil Rights, and Speech, in FEMINISM UNMODIFIED
at 163; see generally Pornography: On Morality and Politics, in MACKINNON, THEORY OF THE STATE,
supra note 33, at 195.
49. "Sexuality, then, is a form of power. Gender, as socially constructed, embodies it, not the
reverse. Women and men are divided by gender, made into the sexes as we know them, by the social
requirements of its dominant form, heterosexuality, which institutionalizes male sexual dominance and
female sexual submission." MACKINNON, THEORY OF THE STATE, Supra note 33, at 113 (footnote omitted).
For a small sampling of other places where MacKinnon makes this point, see id. at xiii, 3, 41, 58-59, 130-
31, the chapters entitled Sexuality and Sex Equality: On Difference and Dominance, and MACKINNON, Not
a Moral Issue, in FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra note 3, at 148-49.
50. See, e.g., CATHARINE A. MAcKINNON, Not a Moral Issue, in FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra
note 3, at 146, 160-61 and MACKINNON, THEORY OF THE STATE, supra note 33, at 197-205, 209-11, and
138-40.
51. "To be rapable, a position that is social not biological, defines what a woman is." MACKINNON,
THEORY OF THE STATE, supra note 33, at 178. Thus, "maleness is a form of power and femaleness is a
form of powerlessness." CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, Francis Biddle 's Sister, in FEMINISM UNMODIFIED,
supra note 3, at 163, 171.
52. CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, Not a Moral Issue, in FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra note 3, at
146, 148; MAcKINNON, THEORY OF THE STATE, supra note 33, at 197.
53. See, e.g., CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, Linda's Life and Andrea's Work, in FEMINISM
UNMODIFIED, supra note 3, at 127, 130; CATHARiNE A. MACKINNON, On Collaboration, id. at 198, 200;
MACKINNON, THEORY OF THE STATE, supra note 33, at 204.
But pornography because it is also an industry, because its dynamic is sexual, and because the
camera requires live fodder, not only springs from abuse and leads to abuse; it is abuse. It is
not merely the groundwork or persuasive basis or impelling rationalization, however, destructive
or immediate, for consequent acts. It is an act.
MacKinnon, Defamation and Discrimination, supra note 3, at 803-04.
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against women and children. 4 Not only are the women who are pornographed
in the production process violated, but women are beaten, raped, tortured, and
even murdered as sex acts.55 But once again, she argues that we must not
overly concentrate on the violent aspects of these acts in the sense of trying
to separate the violence from the sex.56 Although we should not belittle the
reality of physical violence, we should also recognize that physical violence
epitomizes the overall violence-social and psychic as well as physical-of the
masculinist system.5 7 We should concentrate, therefore, on how the physical
54. Recent experimental research on pornography shows that the materials covered by our definition
cause measurable harm to women through increasing men's attitudes and behaviors of
discrimination in both violent and nonviolent forms. . . . On this latter measure [if men knew
they would not be caught], by the way, about a third of all men predict that they would rape,
and half would force sex on a woman.
CATHARINE A.MACKINNON, Francis Biddle's Sister, in FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra note 3, at 163, 187.
See also, MACKINNON, THEORY OF THE STATE, supra note 33, at 144-45, 208-09.
Some researchers believe that their laboratory experiments show the opposite. See, e.g., Daniel
Goleman, New Research Maps the Mind of the Rapist, N.Y. TIMES, December 10, 1991, at Cl, CIO. As
Sunstein discusses, the conclusions that can be drawn from laboratory tests are extremely problematic.
Sunstein, Pornography, supra note 6, at 598.
Adequate alternative ways of performing empirical studies are not readily available. Studying convicted
rapists is unsatisfactory because "the percentage of rapes that are reported and convicted is very small"
so that studies of apprehended rapists "are probably quite unrepresentative." N.M. Malamuth, Aggression
Against Women: Cultural and Individual Causes, in PORNOGRAPHY AND SEXUAL AGGRESSION 23 (N.
Malamuth & E. Donnerstein eds., 1984) [hereinafter Malamuth, Aggression Against Women]. The
distinction the law makes between rape and intercourse serves the social function of making most violative
sex permissible. That is, rape is defined as that which psychopaths do. Men can tell themselves, if I am
not a psychopath, by definition I am not a rapist. "The law of rape is designed so that rape is what
somebody else does and what almost never happens: so that what is done all the time, presumably including
by those who design and interpret and enforce the laws, can be done." MacKinnon, Reflections, supra note
38, at 1300.
At most, studies of convicted rapists might give us some insight as to the type of persons who so
precisely fit our stereotypes of rapists that they can be successfully prosecuted.
One study tried to locate unconvicted rapists by running advertisements in Los Angeles newspapers
asking "Are you a rapist? If so, call me." Malamuth, Aggression Against Women, supra, at 23. Once again,
this study might tell us something about the type of men who would answer such an outrageous ad, but
do we have any reason to think that this sample is representative of rapists generally?
Consequently, many of the authors in the Malamuth and Donnerstein collection concentrate on cross-
cultural and cross-historical comparisons of incidences of sexual violence and the availability of various
forms of pornography. Given the seemingly infinite differences between the cultures of different countries
and historical periods and the impossibility of introducing a control group, these studies have their own
difficulties, as their authors are keenly aware.
55. See supra, note 47. See also CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, Francis Biddle's Sister, in FEMINISM
UNMODIFIED, supra note 3, at 171, and MACKINNON, THEORY OF THE STATE, supra note 33, at 208. "To
be clear: what is sexual is what gives a man an erection.... Whatever else does this, fear does, hostility
does, hatred does, the helplessness of a child or a student or an infantilized or restrained or vulnerable
woman does, revulsion does, death does." Id. at 137.
56. See supra text accompanying note 33.
57. The point of defining rape as 'violence not sex' has been to claim an ungendered and
nonsexual ground for affirming sex (heterosexuality) while rejecting violence (rape). The problem
remains what it has always been: telling the difference. The convergence of sexuality with
violence, long used at law to deny the reality of women's violation, is recognized by rape
survivors with a difference: where the legal system has seen the intercourse in rape, victims see
the rape in intercourse. The uncoerced context for sexual expression becomes as elusive as the
physical acts come to feel indistinguishable. Instead of asking what is the violation of rape, their
experience suggests that the more relevant question is, what is the nonviolation of intercourse?
To know what is wrong with rape, know what is right about sex.
MACKINNON, THEORY OF THE STATE, supra note 33, at 173-74.
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violent aspect of sexuality serves to reinforce the sexual hierarchy.58
Unfortunately, despite the fact that she insists that she is using sexualized
physical violence not as the definition of the harm of pornography, but merely
as an extreme and important example of that harm, her concentration on
violent examples in her writings and speeches serves as an invitation to liberals
like Sunstein, who are uncomfortable with the implications of her critique of
sexuality, to see only the critique of violence.
In pornography, women are deprived of their individuality and are
collectivized as non-persons.5 9 Consequently, to be treated as a woman is to
be recognized as not human."° MacKinnon states that all pornography is
violent, but this is based on a very broad definition of violence to include all
forms of coercion: social, psychic, emotional, as well as physical.61 Not all
58. "Sexual violation symbolizes and actualizes women's subordinate social status to men. It is both
an indication and a practice of inequality between the sexes, specifically of the low status of women relative
to men." MacKinnon, Reflections, supra note 38, at 1302.
Sexual abuse works as a form of terror in creating and maintaining this arrangement. It is a terror
so perfectly motivated and systematically concerted that it never need be intentionally
organized-an arrangement that, as long as it lasted, would seal the immortality of any
totalitarianism. I have come to think that the unique effectiveness of terrorism, like that against
Jews in Argentina, is that it is at once absolutely systematic and absolutely random: systematic
because one group is its target and lives knowing it; random because there is no way of telling
who is next on the list. Just to get through another day, women must spend an incredible amount
of time, life, and energy cowed, fearful, and colonized, trying to figure out how not to be next
on the list.
CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, The Art of the Impossible, in FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra note 3, at 1,
7.
59. The trouble with this [liberal] individuated, atomistic, linear, isolated, tortlike-in a
word, positivistic-conception of injury is that the way pornography targets and defines women
for abuse and discrimination does not work like this. It does hurt individuals, not as individuals
in a one-at-a-time sense, but as members of the group 'women.'
CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, Not a Moral Issue, in FEMINIsM UNMODIFIED, supra note 3, at 146, 156.
MacKinnon makes this point again, in virtually the same language in MAcKINNON, THEORY OF THE STATE,
supra note 33, at 208. See also id. at 209-11. I discuss this aspect of MacKinnon's thought in Jeanne L.
Schroeder, Abduction From the Seraglio: The Logic of Imagination and Feminist Methodologies, 85 TEX.
L. REV. 109, 194-96. (1991) [hereinafter Schroeder, Abduction From the Seraglio].
60. MacKinnon supports her proposition by quoting Richard Rorty paraphrasing MacKinnon:
To be treated like a women [sic] is to be disadvantaged in these ways as an incident of being
assigned to the female sex. To speak of social treatment "as a woman" is thus not to invoke any
universal essence or homogeneous generic or ideal type, but to refer to this diverse material
reality of social meanings and practices such that to be a woman "is not yet the name of a way
of being human."
MacKinnon, Reflections, supra note 38, at 1299.
61. Her discussion as to the continuity of rape and "normal" intercourse illustrates this point:
We also get many women who believe they have never been raped, although a lot of force was
involved .... In other words, in all these situations, there was not enough violence against them to
take it beyond the category of 'sex'; they were not coerced enough. Maybe they were forced-fucked
for years and put up with it, maybe they tried to get it over with, maybe they were coerced by
something other than battery, something like economics, maybe even something like love.
CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, Sex and Violence, in FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra note 3, at 85, 88.
The violence of pornography consists in its construction of sexuality, the eroticization of the
subordination of women. Pornography is a form of "forced sex" in that it forcibly creates our sexuality.
Id. at 148, 172.
Crucially, all pornography by our definition acts dynamically over time to diminish the
consumer's ability to distinguish sex from violence .... The so-called sex-only materials, those
in which subjects perceive no force, also increase perceptions that a rape victim is worthless and
decrease the perception that she was harmed. The overall direction of current research suggests
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pornography depicts physical violence. 2 But the physical violence of some
modes of pornography-most significantly, of "snuff" films in which women
are actually murdered63-epitomizes the function of the gender hierarchy.
Masculine personhood is established by the destruction of feminine
personhood. This is done psychologically and socially in the case of
"normal" heterosexual relationships even as it is done literally and physically
in the case of snuff. For MacKinnon, the psychoanalytic twinning of the
desires for life (Eros) and death (Thanatos) becomes literal, not symbolic.
Pornography is not, therefore, to be defined by violent pornography, as
Sunstein implies. Accordingly, in the proposed legislation MacKinnon drafted
with Andrea Dworkin, MacKinnon defines pornography as the "graphic
sexually explicit subordination of women through pictures or words" that also
that the more express violent materials accomplish with less exposure what the less overtly
violent-that is, the so-called sex-only materials-accomplish over the longer term. Women are
rendered fit for use and targeted for abuse."
Id. at 187.
Quoting a woman who testified at hearings before the Minneapolis city council in favor of
antipornography legislation: "Porn is already a violent act against women. It is our mothers, our daughters,
our sisters, and our wives that are for sale for pocket change at the newsstands in this country." Id. at 192.
She compares pornography to fighting words which inflict harm by their very utterance. Id.
62. "Women in pornography are bound, battered, tortured, humiliated, and killed. Or to be fair to
the soft core, merely taken and used." CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, On Collaboration, in FEMINISM
UNMODIFIED, supra note 3, at 198, 199. MacKinnon makes this point again in similar language in
MACKINNON, THEORY OF THE STATE, supra note 33, at 138, and in MacKinnon, Defamation and
Discrimination, supra note 3, at 706-97.
See in particular MacKinnon's analysis of Playboy magazine in which she refuses to distinguish its
sexual depictions from other more expressly violent forms of pornography. "As if passion is never violent."
MAcKINNON, THEORY OF THE STATE, supra note 33, at 139. She also includes in her definition of force
"the more covert forms of socialization, pressure, and inculcation to passivity and femininity, some in the
more overt forms of poverty and sexual violence." MacKinnon, Defamation and Discrimination, supra
note 3, at 796.
63. You may think snuff is one thing, Playboy another. Our law [i.e. the Dworkin-MacKinnon
antipornography ordinance] says something very simple: a woman is not a thing to be used, any
more than to be abused, and her sexuality isn't either. Why do woman lawyers who identify as
feminists buy and defend the pornographers' view of what a woman is for, what a woman's
sexuality is? Why, when they look in the mirror, do they see the images of themselves the
pornographers put there?
CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, On Collaboration, in FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra note 3, at 198, 200.
Some dispute the existence of snuff films. MacKinnon insists that they exist and is reportedly gathering
evidence on the subject because she believes that the message of snuff-the annihilation of women-is the
ultimate message of sex. Fred Strebeigh, Defining Law on the Feminist Frontier, N. Y. TIMES MAG., Oct.
6, 1991, at 28, 56.
64. "Pornography dispossess women of the power of which, in the same act, it possesses men: the
power of sexual, hence gender, definition. Perhaps a human being, for gender purposes is someone who
controls the social definition of sexuality." CATHARINE A. MACKiNNON, Not a Moral Issue, in FEMINISM
UNMODIFIED, supra note 3, at 146, 158.
It is only to the extent that each of these values is accepted as human that their negation becomes
a quality of, and is eroticized in and as, woman. Only when self-respect is accepted as human
does debasement become sexy and female; only when the avoidance of pain is accepted as human
does torture become sexy and female. In this way, women's sexuality as expressed in
pornography precisely negates her status as human.
CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, Not a Moral Issue, in FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra note 3, at 146, 160.
"Woman through male eyes is sex object, that by which man knows himself at once as man and as
subject." MACKINNON, THEORY OF THE STATE, supra note 33, at 122. "The eroticism that corresponds
to the male side of this epistemology . . . its sexual ontology, is the use of things to experience self.
Women are the things and men are the self." Id. at 123 (footnote omitted).
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include another element.65 The proposed legislation's list of possible
additional elements does include acts of express physical violence-such as
torture and mutilation." But it also includes elements which are not
necessarily physically violent-such as depictions of woman as submissive or
servile.67
MacKinnon at one point-and at only one point-distinguishes between her
defined term "pornography" and a potential definition of "erotica" as "sexually
explicit materials premised on equality."68 This seems to be intended as an
opening to liberals. But any reliance on it in order to equate pornography and
violence is misplaced. MacKinnon in every other place in her works critiques
attempts at distinguishing violent pornography from other forms of erotica.69
This can be seen in her analysis of Deep Throat, an example of hard core
pornography within MacKinnon's definition.7" Although the making of the
film was itself an act of violence in which pornography actress Linda
65. CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, Francis Biddle's Sister: Pornography, Civil Rights, and Speech,
in FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra note 3, at 163, 176. "Our law defines pornography as graphic sexually
explicit pictures or words that subordinate women and also include one or more of a number of specified
scenarios which typify pornography." MacKinnon, Defamation and Discrimination, supra note 3, at 801.
66. "[Includes women ... enjoying pain ... or rape; being tied up, cut up, mutilated, bruised,
or physically hurt; ... penetrated by objects or animals, or presented in scenarios of ... injury, torture;
• . . bleeding, bruised, or hurt in a context which makes these conditions sexual." CATHARINE A.
MACKINNON, Francis Biddle's Sister, in FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra note 3, at 163, 176.
67. "[Wloman dehumanized as sexual objects, things or commodities... enjoying.., humiliation
... in postures of sexual submission or servility or display . . . women's body parts. .. are exhibited
such that women are reduced to such parts .... women are presented as whores by nature ... shown
as filthy or inferior.., in a context that makes these conditions sexual." CATHARINE A. MACKINNON,
Francis Biddle's Sister, in FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra note 3, at 163, 176. (Not all aspects of
pornography are subject to all of the statutory remedies, however. The cause of action for "trafficking"
in pornography, for example, is limited to a subset of pornography and was omitted altogether from the
bill being considered in Massachusetts. See also supra note 29).
Many "classic" naughty pictures, such as the French maid or nurse with bare breasts or behind might
be found by ajury to constitute graphic sexually explicit subordination of woman through pictures that also
includes women in postures of servility. The dumb blond is a depiction of woman as inferior, which would
be defined as pornographic if sexually explicit.
68. CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, Francis Biddle's Sister: Pornography, Civil Rights, and Speech,
in FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra note 3, at 163, 176. To my knowledge, this is the only place in her
published writings in which MacKinnon has made this distinction. The essays in FEMINISM UNMODIFIED
are, of course, texts of speeches which MacKinnon has delivered elsewhere. MacKinnon may very well
have made this point orally on other occasions.
On at least one occasion, however, MacKinnon attributes this proposed distinction between
pornography and erotica to Gloria Steinem. The New York Newsday Interview with Catharine MacKinnon;
Private Acts Are Public Affairs, N. Y. NEWSDAY, June 12, 1989, at 57. As I discuss below in note 92,
read in context, it is not clear whether MacKinnon agrees that this could be a meaningful distinction in
our society.
69. See, e.g., CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, Not A Moral Issue, in FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra
note 3, at 146, 160.
70. CATHARINE A. MAcKINNON, Linda's Life and Andrea's Work, in FEMINISM UNMODIED, supra
note 3, at 127.
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Marchiano was tortured and terrorized in its production,7 1 the film does not
depict physical "violence" in the conventional way Sunstein uses the term.
Rather, the point of the movie was that Marchiano portrayed a sweet young
woman who loved giving oral sex to men. "As [Marchiano] says, what people
remember is the smile on my face."' Once again, however, MacKinnon
invites liberals like Sunstein to see only her critique of the violent nature of
sexuality by concentrating in her description of the movie on the violence of
its creation, and de-emphasizing the lack of violence depicted in the finished
work.
MacKinnon repeatedly emphasizes everywhere else in her writings that she
sees an unbroken continuity between violent pornography, other forms of hard
core pornography,73 soft core pornography,74 Playboy magazine type
"girlie" pictures,7' romance,' sexually oriented advertising,77 art,7 and
71. Marchiano (better known by her stage name, Linda Lovelace) told her story in her book ORDEAL.
See generally LINDA LOVELACE (with Mike McGrady), ORDEAL (1980).
Sunstein does at times include in his discussion of pornography the violence not only in the depiction,
but in the production. See, e.g., Sunstein, Legal Theory, supra note 5, at 841. But, this latter category
seems to disappear entirely in his discussion of what type of pornography will be legally actionable (i.e.
depictions of sexual violence).
72. CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, Linda's Life and Andrea's Work, in FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra
note 3, at 127, 128.
73. See also her description of pornography, as opposed to obscenity, as "sex forced on real women
so that it can be sold at a profit to be forced on other real women; women's bodies trussed and maimed
and raped and made into things to be hurt and obtained and accessed, and this presented as the nature of
women; the coercion that is visible and the coercion that has become invisible-this and more bothers
feminists about pornography." Id. at 147 (emphasis added).
74. Sexual liberation in the liberal sense frees male sexual aggression in the feminist sense.
What looks like love and romance in the liberal view looks a lot like hatred and torture in the
feminist view. Pleasure and eroticism become violation. Desire appears as lust for dominance
and submission. The vulnerability of women's projected sexual availability-that acting we are
allowed: asking to be acted upon-is victimization. Play conforms to scripted roles, fantasy
expresses ideology-is not exempt from it-and admiration of natural physical beauty becomes
objectification.
CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, On Collaboration, in FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra note 3, at 198, 200.
75. See, CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, More than Simply a Magazine: Playboy's Money, in FEMINISM
UNMODIFIED, supra note 3, at 134. "I think that... pornography eroticizes and thereby legitimizes forced
sex, and that Playboy is pornography and makes pornography legitimate." Id. at 137. "You may think snuff
is one thing, Playboy another." CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, On Collaboration, in FEMINISM UNMODIFIED,
supra note 3, at 198, 200.
She therefore criticizes the standard liberal critique which tries to distinguish violent pornography from
erotica while simultaneously opposing antipornography legislationon a "slippery slope" argument. Sunstein,
however, differs somewhat from the standard liberal view in that he adopts the first part of this argument
(violence v. eros), while not adopting the second part (the slippery slope). In doing so he is more consistent
than many.
According to this standard, Playboy isn't 'really' pornography, but it is indistinguishable from
it; since nothing can be done about pornography that wouldn't also hurt Playboy, nothing can
be done about pornography. Playboy is so much a standard that people may even be against what
they call the violence in pornography yet think Playboy is fine. Either they miss or don't mind
the force in and behind Playboy; or if they do see it, they don't feel they can take a stand even
against the more expressly violent pornography, because that might do something to Playboy.
CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, 'More Than Simply A Magazine": Playboy's Money, in FEMINISM
UNMODIFIED, supra note 3, at 134, 138.
76. See, e.g., MACKINNON, THEORY OF THE STATE, supra note 33, at xiii.
77. "This makes me wonder, if taking Playboy's money is okay, is anybody's money too damaging
to take? . . . How about cosmetic companies? Is there a difference-say the famous difference between
1992] Taming of the Shrew
perhaps even mainstream political discussion of the proper role of women and
so-called family values.79 Are Jacques Lacan's psychoanalytical writings
which describe the process by which women seek their own objectification in
intercourse also pornography?' At her most frank, she admits that her
legislation might result in successful litigation based on Playboy magazine, and
certain "traditionally" artistic works.8" But, she insists, to concentrate on such
cause and effect-between those who create the system and those who pander to it?" MacKinnon, Not a
Moral Issue, in FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra note 3, at 145. Of course, in this citation MacKinnon is
emphasizing the functional difference between pornography and advertising in the construction of sexuality.
However, she is also recognizing the continuum between sexuality as constructed by pornography and
sexuality as reflected by advertising. See also MAcKiNNoN, THEORY OF THE STATE, supra note 33, at 203.
78. Courts' difficulties in framing workable standards to separate 'prurient' from other sexual
interest, commercial exploitation from art or advertising, sexual speech from sexual conduct,
and obscenity from great literature make the feminist point. These lines have proved elusive in
law because they do not exist in life. Commercial sex resembles art because both exploit women's
sexuality.
MAcKINNON, THEORY OF THE STATE, supra note 33, at 203. "Pornography becomes difficult to distinguish
from art and ads once it is clear that what is degrading to women is the same as what is compelling to the
consumer." Id. at 113.
79. "Feminist theory sees the family as a unit of male dominance, a locale of male violence and
reproductive exploitation, hence a primary locus of the oppression of women." MACKiNNON, THEORY
OF THE STATE, supra note 33, at 61. See generally, her discussion of the "wages for housework" analysis
of family organization, id. at 68-80.
"Existing standards of literature, art, science, and politics are, in feminist light, remarkably consonant
with pornography's mode, meaning, and message." CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, Not A Moral Issue, in
FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra note 3, at 146, 153. "Commercial sex resembles art because both exploit
women's sexuality." Id. at 154.
Some of her opponents have accused MacKinnon of actually and actively seeking to ban a wide range
of popular culture through this legislation. For example, "The [Minneapolis] ordinance's author, Catharine
MacKinnon.... sought to use the ordinance to ban French and Italian art films, avant-garde art and even
Rolling Stones album covers." Portrait of the New Puritanism, WASH. POST, Feb. 2, 1992, at C8.
In contradistinction, I am not trying to suggest that all of these representations would fall necessarily
within MacKinnon's statutory definition of pornography which requires graphic sexual explicitness. Nor
am I suggesting that, even if it were held that these materials are pornographic, a jury would necessarily
award damages or a judge would order injunctive relief in these cases. Rather, I am emphasizing that
MacKinnon sees these works as part and parcel of the pornographic vision of female sexuality.
80. Indeed, MacKinnon finds substantial parallels between psychoanalytic theory and pornography.
"Behind psychotherapy's guise of treatment, just as surely as beneath pornography's protestations of
liberation, lies the sexual sadism that is at the core of misogyny, here in its medical form." Catharine A.
MacKinnon, Preface to JEFFREY M. MASSON, A DARK SCIENCE: WOMEN, SEXUALITY, AND PSYCHIATRY
IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY xi (Jeffrey M. Masson & Marianne Loring trans., 1986). Although the book
to which MacKinnon wrote this preface is a collection of shocking nineteenth century medical articles
describing medical theories concerning, and treatment of, women (recommending such medical treatments
as cauterizing little girls' genitals with red hot irons to prevent masturbation), she does not limit her
comments to the horrors of the past. "Today, pornography is legitimized in the same way psychoanalysis
is legitimized: it is all in her mind. Psychoanalysis, of which these articles are precursors, has been used
to legitimize pornography, calling it fantasy; and pornography has been used to legitimize psychoanalysis,
to show what women really are. Pornography presents itself as the answer to Freud's query: this is what
women want." id. at xv.
In answer to my specific question as to psychoanalytic literature, I do not believe that Lacan's virtually
impenetrable analysis of the role of the phallus would be considered graphically sexually explicit.
81. See supra notes 75-76. As I have pointed out, MacKinnon does not suggest that the slippery
slope/line drawing problem does not exist. Rather, she believes that its very existence strengthens her
argument that the extremes of pornography are continuous with, not a perversion of, mainstream sexuality.
In American Booksellers Assn. v. Hudnut, Judge Easterbrook suggests that the legislation might make
"Leda and the Swan" actionable as pornography. 771 F.2d 323, 327 (7th Cir. 1985), aff'd, 475 U.S. 1001
(1985)). Certainly, this classical depiction of a woman who, after being raped by a bird, lays eggs can be
interpreted as reflecting a degraded view of women consistent with the pornographic image. Some pictorial
depictions of this myth show the swan between the legs of the naked Leda, apparently in the act of coitus,
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considerations is precisely to engage in the pornographic mind set the
legislation is trying to destroy. That is, by concentrating on the speech, art or
pleasure that might be lost, rather than on the prevention of harm to women,
one is admitting that women are ranked below things-that women are not
considered persons.8 2 "The liberal slippery slope is the feminist totality.""
and may meet the graphic explicitness test of the statute. Others are more coy, and may escape. But what
of William Butler Yeats' poetic description which not only explicitly describes the rape, but explicitly
(though probably not "graphically" in that he relies on standard sexual metaphors of walls and towers)
equates the violence of the act of rape with the violence which subsequently resulted from it (i.e. the Trojan
War and the murder of Agamemnon which were caused by Helen and Clytemnestra, respectively, the two
daughters hatched by Leda)?
A sudden blow: the great wings beating still
Above the staggering girl, her thighs caressed
By the dark webs, her nape caught in his bill,
He holds her helpless breast upon his breast.
How can those terrified vague fingers push
The feathered glory from her loosening thighs?
A shudder in the loins engenders there
The broken wall, the burning roof and tower
And Agamemnon dead ....
William B. Yeats, Leda and The Swan, in THE NORTON ANTHOLOGY OF POETRY 888 (Alexander
W. Allison et al. eds., 1983). I can distinctly remember my shock when my high school English teacher
held up this grotesque depiction of sexual violence as a romantically beautiful, rather than a repugnantly
powerful, example of poetic allusion.
Of course, this analysis ignores alternative mythological interpretations which can be imagined.
Perhaps Leda is a distant memory of the myth of the Great Mother of prehistoric matriarchy who, in her
aspect as bird goddess, hatched the Cosmic World Egg? This avian creatrix of the ancient Near East can
be glimpsed in the book of Genesis as the Spirit of God who broods upon the waters before the creation
of the world. In ancient Greece Leda was also identified with the Titaness Latona and the great goddess
Nemesis who led Zeus in a series of metamorphoses culminating in the swan. ROBERT GRAVES, THE GREEK
MYTHS 62 (1981). Knowing these myths, one might retell Leda's story in terms of feminine power rather
than abjection.
82. This is precisely why MacKinnon rejects judging works "as a whole." For example, see her
discussion of how Playboy magazine's format is carefully designed to comply with the "taken as a whole"
test of obscenity law. CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, "More Than Simply A Magazine": Playboy's Money
in FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra note 3, at 134, 139 (footnote omitted).
Her critique of the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals decision in American Bookseller Assn. Inc. v.
Hudnut, 771 F.2d. 323 (7th Cir. 1985), aft'd, 475 U.S. 1001 (1985)), relates to this. "[T]he courts were
confronted with the real damage pornography does to women's status and treatment as the basis for making
[pornography] civilly actionable to its victims. The courts accepted the harm but held the pornography more
important than those it harms-hence protected it as speech." MACKINNON, THEORY OF THE STATE, supra
note 33, at 213.
83. MACKINNON, THEORY OF THE STATE, supra note 33, at 203. MacKinnon continues:
Just as it is difficult to distinguish literature or art against a background, a standard, of
objectification, it is difficult to discern sexual freedom against a background, a standard, of sexual
coercion. This does not mean that it cannot be done. It means that legal standards will be
practically unenforceable, will reproduce this problem rather than solve it, until they address its
fundamental issue-gender inequality-directly.
Id. at 203-04. In this passage, MacKinnon is arguing that the liberal obscenity approach to sexually explicit
materials will be incapable of making meaningful distinctions, and holds out that her pornography approach
will be more successful because it more accurately identifies the harm to be prevented, i.e., the
subordination of women.
Sunstein, a careful reader, notes MacKinnon's insistence on the continuity between pornography and
other forms of sexual discourse (e.g., "It is in this view that pornography, sexual harassment, rape, and
prostitution are not marginal issues but instead at the core of the problem." Sunstein, Legal Theory, supra
note 5, at 846); the interrelationship between pornography and sexuality ("Pornography is a participant
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And yet, despite MacKinnon's constant repitition of her thesis, she once again
gives prominence, both in vividness of rhetoric and in length, to her
discussions of the most disturbing forms of violent hard core pornography.
This enables Sunstein understandably to concentrate on only that aspect.
I presume that Sunstein sincerely, if ingenuously, believes that he views
women from a position of equality. As he does not subjectively experience
himself as wanting to oppress women, he resists accepting MacKinnon's
suggestion that his very masculine sexuality-and thereby his very selfhood-is
oppressive of women. Accordingly, he assumes that he can discern the
difference between subordinating pornography and equality-preserving erotica.
The radical presupposition of MacKinnon's whole argument is that our self-
serving descriptions of own own intentionality can be illusory or delusional.
The declaration by a liberal man of a belief in sexual equality does not become
true just because the declarant experiences himself as sincere. Women as a
class are not today equal to men socially, politically, economically,
psychically, physically, or any other way." Heterosexuality is, in our society,
the structure of inequality. The feelings of pleasure in sexuality which we
women occasionally feel are not evidence of equality, but are understandable
internalizations of the construction of our sexuality as the eroticization of our
subordination."g
For MacKinnon, individual women sometimes attain moments of freedom,
a "rare and valuable and contradictory event" in our society. 6 How else
in the construction and perpetuation of a sexual hierarchy." Id. at 835); and MacKinnon's critique of
sexuality itself, Id. at 846. But he promptly deemphasizes, and then ignores, these points by distancing
himself from MacKinnon's analysis of sexuality and limiting his analysis to violent pornography and the
amelioration of sexual violence. Id. at 835, 846.
84. This is the basis of MacKinnon's brilliant dominance approach to sexual inequality. Men have
the power to make the myth into reality. See, e.g., MACKINNON, THEORY OF THE STATE, supra note 33,
at 103, 215.
MacKinnon's critiques of Carol Gilligan's different moral voice theory, of "subjectivist" approaches
to consciousness raising, and of the negative freedoms guaranteed by liberal political theory are precisely
that they all incorrectly assume that women already are able to experience equality and subjectivity in the
current masculinist society. Id. at 51, 116, 163, 169.
85. I think that sexual desire in women, at least in this culture, is socially constructed as that
by which we come to want our own self-annihilation. That is, our subordination is eroticized in
and as female; in fact, we get off on it to a degree if nowhere near as much as men do.
CATHARINE A. MAcKINNON, Desire and Power in FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra note 3, at 46, 54.
"Women's complicity in their condition does not contradict its fundamental unacceptability if women have
little choice but to become persons who then freely choose women's roles. For this reason, the reality of
women's oppression is, finally, neither demonstrable nor refutable empirically." MACKINNON, THEORY
OF THE STATE, supra note 33, at 124. "Some women eroticize dominance and submission; it beats feeling
forced." Id. at 177.
Women and men both know men find rape sexual and pornography erotic . . . . sexuality is
commonly violent without being any the less sexual. To deny this sets up the situation so that
when women are aroused by sexual violation, experience it as women's sexuality, the feminist
analysis is seen to be contradicted. But it is not contradicted, it is proved. The male supremacist
definition of female sexuality as lust for self-annihilation has won.
Id. at 211-12.
86. Sex feeling good may mean that one is enjoying one's subordination; it would not be the
first time. Or it may mean that one has glimpsed freedom, a rare and valuable and contradictory
event. Under existing conditions, what else would freedom be? The point is, the possible varieties
of interpersonal engagement, including the pleasure of sensation or the experience of intimacy,
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could she explain herself? But these rare moments should not be confused with
the norm or the predictably attainable. 7 To pretend that we can achieve
equality in this society is the "magical approach""8  to sexual
equality-wishing it were so. 9 Rather, we must radically change society so
that equality is attainable.' Consequently, although incidences of "erotica"
in the sense of a conjunction of explicit sex with sexual equality might
occasionally occur, they can be expected to be rare and wondrous. Indeed,
insofar as masculinism has constructed sex as sexual hierarchy and has
eroticized inequality, it is not clear that, given the current social structure, we
could even conceptualize what sexual equality might be,91 let alone experience
a depiction of sexual equality as erotic. 92
does not, things being as they are, make sex empowering for women.
CATHARINE A. MAcKINNON, Afterword, in FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra note 3, at 215, 218.
87. Many women in this country believe gender is a crushing reality from which no woman is
exempt. They also believe, or rather act out a belief on a daily basis, that they are or can be
exempt. If every tacit 'present company excluded' exception I encountered on the road were
excluded from this analysis, an analysis would remain that everyone accepts as generally true,
but that almost no one-meaning nearly everyone-acknowledges applies to them in particular.
CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, Afterword, in FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra note 3, at 215, 218.
88. Id. at 219.
89. "In this conception of politics as fantasy and entertainment, the speaker speaks as though what
she wishes were true is true as a strategy for making it so. Speak as though women are not victimized and
we will not be any more." Id. at 221. See also MACKINNON, THEORY OF THE STATE, supra note 33, at
50.
90. "Male dominance here is not an artificial overlay upon an underlying inalterable substratum of
uncorrupted essential sexual being. Sexuality free of male dominance will require change, not
reconceptualization, transcendence, or excavation." CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, Not a Moral Issue, in
FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra note 3, at 146, 149. "Central to the institutionalization of male dominance,
pornography cannot be reformed or suppressed or banned. It can only be changed." Id. at 146.
91. "Women are not permitted fully to know what sex equality would look like, because they have
never lived it. It is idealist, hence elitist, to hold that they do." MACKINNON, THEORY OF THE STATE,
supra note 33, at 241. Because sex equality does not presently exist for us to observe, it can only exist
in our imagination. "Given the pervasiveness of inequality, imagination is the faculty required to think in
sex equality terms." MacKinnon, Reflections, supra note 38, at 1327.
92. "Maybe feminists are considered castrating because equality is not sexy." MACKINNON, THEORY
OF THE STATE, supra note 33, at 145.
In answer to a question by a reporter for NEW YORK NEWSDAY, MacKinnon discusses Gloria
Steinem's definition of erotica (as opposed to pornography) as sexual depictions premised on relations of
mutuality and equality. She continued, however, to question whether heterosexuality can be experienced
in a position of equality in our society.
A. If that's true [i.e. that the depictions are premised on relations of mutuality], then that's fine
and our law would be indifferent to it. But what we have found is what the pornographers have
found: the key to getting men [aroused] is abusing women in a way that's sexually explicit.
Q. You believe all relationships between the sexes, even the most intimate, are structured by
inequality. Doesn't that challenge the way most people perceive their personal lives?
A. It does. The presumption about intimacy is that the issue is sex and not power, that when
people are intimate they are on a terrain of equality. But I don't see how women and men who
are not equal in society can have relationships in which the norms are presumptively ones of
equality.
The New York Newsday Interview With Catharine MacKinnon; Private Acts Are Public Affairs, supra note
68, at 57.
The anxiety of the pornography/erotica question is: What can we still have? The anxiety in that
question is: If everything that abuses women and gets men hard is pornography, then what's left
that can be sexually arousing? And the anxiety in that question is: If you don't abuse women,
maybe you don't get hard .... Men getting hard is not my problem. Women getting abused is
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B. Mechanics
If pornography is the focus of MacKinnon's analysis because it not only
reflects, but epitomizes, the gender hierarchy, why should we expect that
making pornography legally actionable would change the status quo?
MacKinnon has several answers.
First, and most importantly, MacKinnon goes further than merely
suggesting that pornography epitomizes the gender hierarchy. In our society
pornography is a primary means by which men construct sexuality. By making
pornography actionable, and thereby more difficult to produce, we will, if not
eliminate, substantially cripple, an important mechanism which produces
sexuality. The antipornography legislation would interfere with the constructive
aspect of pornography by serving as a public declaration by our society that
the values epitomized in pornography are unacceptable. The legislation would
reveal (by legal recognition) the harms of pornography which are otherwise
invisible.93 By using a civil rights approach, the legislation seeks to "expose
the atrocities to women."' It is a social declaration that women are
subordinated, that sex equality is a goal which must be actively sought and that
pornography is a practice of sex discrimination. Litigation under the legislation
would result in a public condemnation and disgrace of people who promulgate
the values inherent in pornography and would thereby delegitimate the
pornographic vision.9"
Second, the proposed antipornography legislation gives individual women
(rather than the state96) the primary role of instituting actions.97 This
empowerment of women would be a social recognition of women as acting
subjects. This denies the truth of pornography, and thereby interferes with
pornography's ability to realize its program of hierarchial domination.
Pornography defines woman as non-human,9 and states that women want
their own pain." Antipornography legislation would recognize that
pornography, the speech of men, silences the speech of women by denying
my problem.
Catharine A. MacKinnon, quoted in Terry Carter, MacKinnon Leaves Yale Grads With Tough Talk on Sex
Abuse, NAT'L L.J., July 17, 1989, at 4.
93. "So the issue is not what the harm of pornography is, but how the harm of pornography is to
become visible. As compared with what? To the extent pornography succeeds in constructing social reality,
it becomes invisible as harm." MACKINNON, THEORY OF THE STATE, supra note 33, at 204.
94. MacKinnon, testifying in favor of the proposed legislation in Wisconsin, quoted in Bass, supra
note 2.
95. CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, "More Than Simply a Magazine: Playboy's Money, in FEMINsM
UNMODIFIED, supra note 3, at 134, 140.
96. MACKINNoN, THEORY OF THE STATE, supra note 33, at 161.
97. CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, On Collaboration, in FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra note 3, at 198,
203.
98. MACKINNON, THEORY OF THE STATE, supra note 33, at 210. "Pornography increases men's
perception that women want rape and are not injured by rape, that women are worthless, trivial, non-
human, object-like, and unequal to men." MacKinnon, Defamation and Discrimination, supra note 3, at
799.
99. MACKINNON, THEORY OF THE STATE, supra note 33, at 210.
19921
Yale Journal of Law and Feminism [Vol. 5:123
women's status as persons and denying the sounds which issue from the
mouths of women the status of speech."° It would give voice to women's
viewpoint by denying the "truth" of pornography: that women want what men
want them to want. 101 Permitting women to bring a legal action gives them
a legal voice, thereby recognizing them as members of the legally recognizable
class of creatures called human beings."
Third, MacKinnon attempts to show that pornography is causally related
to sexualized violence."°3 Although she does not spell out the mechanism
100. "But the evidence shows that the use of pornography makes it impossible for men to tell when
sex is forced, that women are human, and that rape is rape. Pornography makes men hostile and aggressive
toward women, and it makes women silent." MacKinnon, Defamation and Discrimination, supra note 3,
at 801.
101. This concept of complementarity is an important aspect of psychoanalytic theory. See generally
ELIZABETH GROSZ, JACQUES LACAN: A FEMINIST INTRODUCTION (1990). As discussed supra note 80,
MacKinnon notes that both pornography and psychoanalysis try to make women want what men want them
to want. Lacan's concept of complementarity, however, derives from Hegel's theory that all human beings
are driven by a desperate need to be recognized by other human beings. In Lacan's terminology, "man's
desire is the desire of the other." JACQUES LACAN, THE SEMINAR OF JACQUES LACAN, BOOK I: FREUD'S
PAPERS ON TECHNQUE 1953-54 46-47(Jacques-Alain Miller ed. & John Forrester trans., 1988) [hereinafter
LACAN, FREUD'S PAPERS ON TECHNIQUE].
Such a conception of humanity, which goes beyond the liberal notion of autonomous subjects acting
in narrow self-interest, would have great interest to those feminists who privilege relationality and
community.
The violence and violation of the pornographic mindset (and perhaps also of many aspects of Lacan's
theory) does not lie in the recognition of man's desire to be desired, but in its attempt to force women to
act as though they actually do already desire what men desire, so that women become the object of men's
subjective desire, rather than exploring and seeking to become the object of women's desire.
Indeed, in Lacan's pathetic vision of human nature, complementarity is always longed for but never
achieved-there are no sexual relations, only failed attempts. See GROSZ, JACQUES LACAN, id.
at 137. See also Ellie Ragland-Sullivan, The Sexual Masquerade: A Lacanian Theory of Sexual Difference,
in LACAN AND THE SUBJECT OF LANGUAGE 49 (Ellie Ragland-Sullivan & Mark Bracher eds., 1991).
102. "[An alternate law] is a criminal approach that puts the power in the hands of the state. Our
approach puts power in the hands of the people who were hurt.... Women are indeed human beings and
the rights of pornographers, pimps, do not matter more. . . ." MacKinnon, testifying in favor of proposed
anti-pornography legislation in Wisconsin, quoted in Bass, supra note 2.
In her writings, MacKinnon generally highlights the fact that, under her proposal, women would have
a private right of action to address the harms of pornography, but the government would not have the right
to censor pornography. Elsewhere she suggests that this choice is also at least partly the result of political
expediency given the current state of First Amendment jurisprudence. For example, on a radio talk show
MacKinnon discussed a decision of the Canadian Supreme Court which found that the infringement of
expression caused by Canadian obscentity law was outweighed by the harm caused by pornography.
MacKinnon had helped write the winning brief in the case and generally praised the decision. She tried
to reassure a caller who expressed concern against government censorship. She pointed out that the
Canadian constitutional provision that is most closely analagous to our First Amendment permits a greater
degree of censorship than our Constitution. Consequently, she is not proposing that Canadian-type
censorship of pornography be adopted in the United States. "What's been proposed for the United States
and the origin of this approach is not that the government be permitted to censor materials through the
criminal law, but rather that women be able to sue civilly for sex discrimination." Transcript of Interview
with Professor Catherine [sic] MacKinnon, On The Line, WNYC Public Radio, March 9, 1992. The
implication, of course, is that if censorship were permitted by the First Amendment, MacKinnon's
American anti-pornography proposal might also include criminal censorship.
103. See text accompanying note 136; infra, MacKinnon does not base her theory on the proposal
that any specific piece of pornography can be shown to be the proximate cause of any specific event of
physical violence. MACKINNON, THEORY OF THE STATE, supra note 33, at 207-08. This is why the
"harm" recognized by her proposed legislation is "the harm of civil inequality." CATHARINE A.
MACKINNON, Francis Biddle's Sister: Pornography, Civil Rights, and Speech, in FEMNISM UNMODIFIED,
supra note 3, at 163, 178. MacKinnon's propsed legislation does, however, give a cause of action to victims
of "physical attack, or injury ... directly caused by specific pornography" against producers and sellers
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precisely, presumably the legislation would make it more expensive for
pornographers to operate and thus would decrease the output of pornography.
Consequently, the legislation would also be expected to reduce the amount of
sexualized violence as traditionally conceived (i.e., physically violent rape,
torture and murder).1 This, of course, is the aspect of MacKinnon's
proposal which Sunstein embraces.
Lastly, MacKinnon argues that it does not follow that because pornography
is not the only form of misogyny that regulating pornography is not one way
to fight misogyny. 5 This argument, which depicts pornography as merely
a form of misogyny,"° is arguably inconsistent with other aspects of
MacKinnon's theory of pornography which insists both that pornography is
not different in kind from other forms of misogyny, but is the extreme
exemplar of misogyny, and that pornography is the fundamental mechanism
by which sex is constructed. This last argument should, consequently, be seen
merely as one of political expediency to assuage the fears of those, such as
Sunstein, who do not accept her more basic analysis, rather than a statement
of MacKinnon's own view.
MacKinnon's proposal against pornography is not merely an anti-crime bill
to rein in sexual violence-although it does have that aspect. Her critique goes
to all heterosexual relationships and the gender hierarchy. It is part and parcel
of the strategy which has recognized sexual harassment as an actionable form
of sexual discrimination, which seeks to make rape similarly civilly actionable
as discrimination and which seeks to have the law analyze abortion rights in
terms of equality, rather than the right to privacy. 7 The articulated goal of
the legislation is to subvert the heterosexual status quo.'08
One of the important results of this should be to ameliorate sexual violence.
of pornography. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra note 3, at 290 n.93. For example,
MacKinnon has stated that the version of the antipornography legislation proposed in Massachusetts (see
supra note 29) would give a woman who is forced to watch a specific pornographic video and then perform
the acts in the video the right to sue the maker of the video for her harm. Tamar Lewin, Pornography Foes
Push for Right to Sue, N.Y. TIMES, March 15, 1992, at A16. This suggests an argument based on
proximate cause.
104. The First Amendment guarantee of "speech against abridgment by government, recognizes
exceptions. It is also at times outweighed by other interests. The most common reason is harm: the harm
done by the materials outweighs their expressive value, if any." CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, On
Collaboration, in FEMINISM UNMODFIED, supra note 3, at 198, 203.
This phrase implies that the legislation would reduce the amount of pornography, in addition to
counteracting its effect. The harm to be prevented is great, and the remedy rather mild in that the ordinance
would not constitute prior restraint, id.
105. CATHARINE A. MAcKINNON, Afterword, in FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra note 3, at 215, 222.
106. [Plornography, they say, is effect and not cause because the oppression of women
predates pornography, so anything done about pornography will do nothing about the oppression
of women. It does not matter that racism happens in specific forms all over the world without
ceasing to be racist .... They do not say apartheid should be ignored as effect rather than cause
because white racism predates it and happens elsewhere in different forms.
CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, Afterword, in FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra note 3, at 215, 222.
107. See generally MacKinnon, Reflections, supra note 38.
108. Consequently, MacKinnon argues that pornography is discrimination and cannot adequately be
addressed as group defamation. MacKinnon, Defamation and Discrimination, supra note 3.
1992]
154 Yale Journal of Law and Feminism [Vol. 5:123
But this is not because, as Sunstein suggests, violence is the primary violation.
Even most conservative and misogynist masculinists probably believe they are
horrified by the murder and torture of women. Rather, sexuality, the system
of the subordination of women, is the violation of which violence is only one
aspect (albeit an extremely important and characteristic one). By focusing on
violence alone Sunstein domesticates feminism and tries to trivialize the
tremendous power and potential radicalism of MacKinnon's insights.
C. First Amendment
Similarly, MacKinnon's response to First Amendment challenges to her
proposal is not, as Sunstein suggests, that pornography is "low-level" speech
in the sense of non-political. MacKinnon specifically wishes to avoid the
high/low-level distinction because it suggests that the status of women is a low-
level subject.o" She believes that there is nothing more political than the
gender hierarchy. Her approach is more radical.
First and foremost, as a political matter, she challenges the very suggestion
that we should weigh the elimination of the subjugation of women against the
loss of speech (or even art). Such an approach, in MacKinnon's view, is an
admission to masculinism that women are not persons in our society-they are
less than things or ideas." °
109. In discussing the concept of "high-value" and "low-value" speech, MacKinnon states, "But at
least it is now clear that whatever the value of pornography is-and it is universally conceded to be
low-the value of women is lower." MACKINNON, Sexual Politics of the First Amendment, in FEMINISM
UNMODIFIED, supra note 3, at 211.
One might be inclined to reply to MacKinnon that in traditional Western thought we often consider
ideas and things of higher value than individuals such that sometimes we consider the greatest and most
human act to be precisely to die for ideas. Christians believe that Christ died for our sins. We regularly
send young men (and now also young women) to die for their country. I believe that the distinction
MacKinnon would make is in these noble cases the victim offers up his life for something he considers
to be a higher value. In pornography, MacKinnon sees men as sacrificing women's lives for the base
purpose of men's sensual pleasure.
110. Probably her strongest language in this regard is:
I must also say that the First Amendment has become a sexual fetish through years of absolutist
writing in the melodrama mode in Playboy in particular. You know those superheated articles
where freedom of speech is extolled and its imminent repression is invoked. Behaviorally,
Playboy's consumers are reading about the First Amendment, masturbating to the women, reading
about the First Amendment, masturbating to the women, reading about the First Amendment,
masturbating to the women. It makes subliminal seduction look subtle. What is conveyed is not
only that using women is as legitimate as thinking about the Constitution, but also that if you
don't support these views about the Constitution, you won't be able to use these women.
MACKINNON, Id. at 209. See also CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, "More Than Simply a Magazine":
Playboy's Money, in FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra note 3, at 134, 138; CATHARINE A. MAcKINNON,
Not a Moral Issue, in FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra note 3, at 146, 152-54.
She uses similar rhetoric elsewhere to suggest a cause and effect approach between pornography and
misogynist theories of women:
Pornography was the exclusive possession of the elite until mass media democratized it. In the
nineteenth century, men were looking at pornography, writing theology; looking at pornography,
writing literature; looking at pornography, writing laws and designing our political institutions.
Who is to say they were not also looking at pornography and writing and practicing science and
medicine? The world of Freudian psychology, in which everyday objects are infused with sexual
meanings, is very like the world of pornography, in which everyday life is transformed into an
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Whether or not there should be a First Amendment to our Constitution
which seems to value ideas over people, we are currently stuck with a First
Amendment and we need to deal with it. MacKinnon therefore suggests that
we reinterpret the First Amendment to require the government affirmatively
to promote the speech of the disempowered, rather than merely negatively to
refrain from prohibiting speech."' Adopting the "hate speech" or "paradox
of tolerance" argument which has become fairly familiar, MacKinnon argues
that sometimes the only way to promote speech by one group is to inhibit the
speech of another. She argues that it is not acceptable to tell women that they
must allow pornographers to speak when the pornographer's message is that
"women may not speak." What is more, pornographers (epitomizing the
masculinist status quo) have the power to make their message reality. 2 The
usual remedy of "more speech" for "bad speech" does not work in the case
of pornography where the pornographer's speech is by definition women's
silence." 3 As I have argued elsewhere, insofar as pornography defines
women as non-persons, and women's speech as non-speech, pornography
defines women's speech away. In pornography, women's speech is like the
barking of dogs. Feminists are whining bitches." 4
MacKinnon believes that her ordinance is consistent with, and will further
the policy behind the First Amendment so reconceptualized, because it will
guarantee women's rights . . . by making visible a conflict of rights
between the equality guaranteed to all women and what, in some legal
sense, is now the freedom of the pornographers to make and sell, and
their consumers to have access to, the materials this ordinance defines.
Judicial resolution of this conflict, if the judges do for women what
they have done for others, is likely to entail a balancing of the rights
of women arguing that our lives and opportunities, including our
freedom of speech and action, are constrained by-and in many cases
flatly precluded by, in, and through-pornography ....
erotic spectacle for men and a chamber of horrors for women.
MacKinnon, Preface to MASSON, A DARK SCIENCE, supra note 80, at xvii-xviii.
111. Sunstein has developed a similar argument. See Sunstein, Pornography, supra note 6, and
Sunstein, Neutrality, supra note 8.
112. See generally CATHARINE A. MAcKINNON, Nota Moral Issue, in FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra
note 3, at 146, 155-56; CATHARINE A. MAcKINNON, Francis Biddle's Sister: Pornography, Civil Rights,
and Speech, in FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra note 3, at 163, 164-65, 178-79, 193, 195; CATHARINE A.
MACKINNON, The Sexual Politics ofthe First Amendment, in FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra note 3, at 206,
207-8.
113. See, eg., CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, Francis Biddle's Sister: Pornography, Civil Rights, and
Speech, in FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra note 3, at 163, 193-95, and On Collaboration, in FEMINISM
UNMODIFIED, supra note 3, at 198, 204-05.
114. See Schroeder, Subject:Object, supra note 42.
115. CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, Francis Biddle's Sister: Pornography, Civil Rights, and Speech,
in FEMINISM UNMODIFMD, supra note 3, at 163, 177.
1992]
Yale Journal of Law and Feminism
MacKinnon's third interrelated argument leads from this. She is arguing
that pornography can be regulated under the First Amendment not because it
is low-level non-political speech, but because it is political non-speech.
Contemporary First Amendment theory recognizes that acts can be regulated
while speech cannot, but sometimes the distinction between what is speech and
what are acts is not clear. For example, sometimes we recognize that acts (e.g.
burning the American flag) should be considered speech for First Amendment
purposes. MacKinnon turns this argument on its head: if sometimes acts might
be speech, then sometimes speech might be acts. She argues that pornography,
which defines women's speech as non-speech and thereby silences women,
should be recognized as an "act", not speech.' 16 Unlike other forms of
speech which affect behavior through the content of the words spoken, the
effect of pornography flows from its very existence. Pornography does not
persuade people to adopt a specific political view of sexual relations, it creates
sexuality. Perhaps the appropriate analogy is that pornography is like
hypnotism, bio-feedback, subliminal suggestion and other forms of behavior
modification rather than like speech. This approach is similar to, but goes
much farther than, Sunstein's distinction between cognitive and noncognitive
speech. 117
Finally, MacKinnon reluctantly argues that even if pornography is
considered speech for First Amendment purposes, it should not be considered
political speech. The fact that pornography has political consequences (the
oppression of women) does not mean that its content is political.' This final
116. See, e.g., CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, On Collaboration, in FEMINIsM UNMODIFIED, supra
note 3, at 198, 200-03; MACKINNON, THEORY OF THE STATE, supra note 33, at 204.
Judge Easterbrook, while finding the Indianapolis legislation to be unconstitutional, in a peculiar way
may have understood this aspect of MacKinnon's reasoning better than her purported supporter, Sunstein.
Easterbrook recognized that in MacKinnon's analysis pornography was political and that the purpose of
the legislation was political transformation, not suppression of crime. Easterbrook recognized both that
on its own terms the legislation was not aimed primarily at sexual violence but at sexual subordination and
also that pornography is not an aberration, but the epitome, of the heterosexual status quo. That is, much
of traditional Western high art would constitute actionable sexually explicit depictions of sexual
subordination within the meaning of the statute. He even recognized the tolerance dilemma in which
allowing pornographers to speak might have the result of creating less, not more, speech.
What he rejected is the speech/act dichotomy. Easterbrook correctly surmised that MacKinnon asserted
the speech/act dichotomy precisely because she does not accept mainstream First Amendment theory. The
argument, in Easterbrook's view, proves too much.
It seems unlikely that the present U.S. Supreme Court would adopt the speech/act dichotomy. Indeed,
in R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, Minnesota,-U.S.-, 112 S.Ct. 2538 (1992), Justice Scalia stated those who
characterize "obscentity 'as not being speech at all'" do not mean this literally. Id. at 2543. Rather, he
believes such statements are shorthand for the view "that these areas of speech can, consistently with the
First Amendment, be regulated because of their constitutionally proscribable content (obscentity,
defamation, etc.)-not that they are categories of speech entirely invisible to the Constitution, so that they
may be made the vehicles for content discrimination unrelated to their distinctively proscribable content."
Id. Justice Scalia in this passage specifically refers to Sunstein's views as expressed in Sunstein,
Pornography, supra note 6. Whether or not this accurately reflects Sunstein's analysis of the speech/act
dichotomy, I do not believe that it accurately reflects MacKinnon's.
117. See supra notes 12-14.
118. CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, Not a Moral Issue, in FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra note 3, at
146, 154; CATHARINE A. MAcKINNON, Francis Biddle's Sister: Pornography, Civil Rights, and Speech,
in FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra note 3, at 163, 193.
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argument is the one which Sunstein adopts in his low-level, high-level speech
distinction. "9
III. KISS ME KATE: MACKINNON AND SUNSTEIN RECONCILED
How could a scholar as careful as Sunstein so misread MacKinnon? First,
as I have already suggested, Sunstein might be attempting to bring her thought
into the mainstream by removing the seemingly radical attack on
heterosexuality itself and substituting a relatively noncontroversial attack on
violence qua violence. Second, as I have already suggested, MacKinnon's own
writings contain mutually inconsistent threads, including the one which
Sunstein adopts. I shall explore this more thoroughly in this section and will
argue that these inconsistent strands ultimately dissolve into tautologies. Third,
as I shall explore in the final section of this essay, MacKinnon's conclusions
about sexuality, which she draws from her analysis of pornography, are radical
but not progressive. They are radical in their return to the reactionary, flesh-
fearing Christian roots (radices) of Western culture and are, therefore, deeply
conservative and potentially supportive of the status quo.
A. Narrow and Broad Definitions
One potentially confusing aspect of MacKinnon's writings is that she uses
the word "pornography" in at least two related but different ways." ° The
narrower use is the technical definition used in her statute-sexually explicit
depictions of the subordination of women.1 2' This definition is intentionally
narrow so that the legislation would pass First Amendment criticism based on
a "slippery slope" argument. 22 The narrow definition is the sole focus of
Sunstein's analysis. Furthermore, as I have shown, he limits his definition to
those portions which expressly deal with depictions of sexualized violence to
women. By doing so he ostensibly supports her specific legal proposal while
weakening the true radicalness of the political theory of sexuality upon which
her anti-pornography legislation and her broader definition of pornography is
based.
We have seen that MacKinnon's mode of analysis concentrates on
pornography as the eroticization of sexual hierarchy and, therefore, as one of
119. See supra note 13.
120. The two definitions I am identifying are examples of a definitional spectrum which she travels
along. MacKinnon states that her statutory and analytical definitions of pornography are close. "No
definition can convey the meaning of a word as well as its use in context can. However, what Andrea
Dworkin and I mean by pornography is rather well-captured in our legal definition." MACKiNNON,
FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra note 3, at 262 n.1. I will suggest that the scope of the two are quite
different.
121. See supra text accompanying notes 65-81.
122. CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, On Collaboration, in FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra note 3, at
198, 198-202.
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the central mechanisms by which the sexual hierarchy is codified and
maintained."2 The pornographic image is seen to be continuous with the
"normal" image of sexuality.1 24 Consequently, she insists that a bright line
cannot be drawn between pornography and other writings, depictions, and
discourse about sexuality."2 According to MacKinnon this demonstrates the
truth value of her argument. Alternately, it shows that her argument dissolves
into an analytically useless tautology.
B. Tautologies
Let us go through the argument again, this time more slowly. First,
MacKinnon makes what seems to be a typical postmodern argument that our
sexuality is socially constructed-sexuality is nothing other than what we think,
say, and do about it. Second, she eloquently argues that in this view sexuality
is a socio-political system of male dominance and female subordination. Third,
she defines pornography as the eroticization of the subordination of women.
Fourth, she argues that this indicates that pornography, as so defined, is not
an aberration but the epitome of normal sexuality so that pornographic works
are part of an unbroken continuum with all other forms of sexual discourse
and practice. That is, there is no meaningful line that can be drawn between
rape and normal intercourse; prostitution and marriage; hard core violent
pornography and soft core erotica or even romance. Fifth, she asserts that
pornography is a primary mechanism in which our society constructs sexuality
as dominance and subordination.
She powerfully and convincingly argues for the proposition that
pornography narrowly defined (in the sense of the sexual subordination of
women, sexualized violence, etc.) is continuous with "normal sex" and
therefore is a form of sex, not violence. This implies that an exploration of
pornography will give us insights into sexuality. She goes further, however
and claims that sexuality is the pornographic image of sexuality.126 If
pornography becomes analytically equivalent with all sex discourse and
practice in our society, and sexuality is what we say, think, and do about
sexuality, then by definition "pornography," so broadly defined, becomes a
primary means of constructing sexuality. Her definition of pornography risks
becoming equivalent to "that which constructs sexuality" and her argument
risks degenerating into "that which constructs sexuality, constructs sexuality."
A typical criticism of MacKinnon's pornography analysis is exemplified
by Zillah Eisenstein's reproach that pornography may not be universally
123. See supra text accompanying notes 45-53.
124. See supra text accompanying notes 43-47, 73-79.
125. See supra text accompanying note 83.
126. This is rather like arguing that since purple light is continuous with green light-i.e. they are
both parts of the electromagnetic spectrum of visible light-we can conclude that this proposition in and
of itself proves the converse, i.e. all light is purple.
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victimizing. "'Pornography carries many messages other than woman-hating
.. . ." If pornography is not universally victimizing, then a sweeping
indictment of it can create a new problem-denial of the freedom to engage
in multiple sexual practices."127 That is, if there is no reality other than our
understanding of reality, and some women feel that they experience equality
and emancipation in heterosexuality, why is their experience less socially real
than MacKinnon's account of sexual oppression? Eisenstein presumes, as many
do, that MacKinnon is accusing other women of false consciousness, when a
false consciousness approach is arguably inconsistent with a postmodern social
theory. 2 " This argument falls on deaf ears, however, because it can only
function as an external critique based upon a prior rejection of MacKinnon's
definitions. 129
If one accepts MacKinnon's definitions, she is entitled to claim that she
is not accusing women who enjoy pornography of false consciousness. If
sexuality is a social system of dominance and subordination, and this is
codified in pornography, pleasure in pornography is a perfectly appropriate
and sexually healthy response for women.13 ° That is, under MacKinnon's
internal analysis, the actual imagery of any individual piece of erotica and the
actual empirical subjective experiences of joy, love, or liberation individual
women might find in heterosexual sex are not false, they are simply irrelevant
to the question of whether or not heterosexuality is oppressive.
This is because sexuality is defined as the system of the subordination of
women and pornography is defined as the depiction of the subordination of
women. Pornography thus becomes so expansively defined that it includes all
sexual discourse in our society. MacKinnon is correct to say that under her
analysis, the issue is whether or not heterosexuality is the structure of
oppression.13 1 Once one decides that heterosexuality is to be defined as the
127. ZI.LAH R. EISENSTEIN, THE FEMALE BODY AND THE LAW 171 (1988) (quoting Lisa Duggan
et al., False Promises: Feminist Antipornography Legislation in the U.S. in WOMEN AGAINST CENSORSHIP
(Varda Burstyn ed., 1985)).
Eisenstein notes that MacKinnon and Dworkin, like the new right, assume a traditional view where
pornography is something liked by men and disliked by women. Although men are still the overwhelming
consumers of pornography, women make up an increasing percentage of the market.
128. Many other feminists have misinterpreted MacKinnon as accusing other women of false
consciousness or otherwise dismissing the experiences of women with whom she disagrees. See, eg.,
Katharine T. Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods, 103 HARv. L. REV. 829, 867 (1990); Katharine T. Bartlett,
MacKinnon's Feminism: Power on Whose Terms?, 75 CAL. L. REV. 1559, 1564 (1987); Ruth Colker,
Feminism, Theology, and Abortion: Toward Love, Compassion, and Wisdom, 77 CAL. L. REV. 1011, 1035
(1989); Lucinda M. Finley, The Nature of Domination and the Nature of Women: Reflections on Feminism
Unmodified, 82 Nw. U. L. REV. 352, 380 (1988); Deborah L. Rhode, Feminist Critical Theories, 42 STAN.
L. REv. 617, 623 (1990).
129. EISENSTEIN, supra note 127, at 173. I must give Eisenstein credit for at least implicitly
recognizing that the way MacKinnon uses the word "pornography" in her writings is not the same as the
definition she uses in her statute. But her failure to explicitly do so undermines her legal critique of
MacKinnon's proposed anti-pornography legislation which is based on the narrow definition. If the anti-
pornography legislation were intended to regulate pornography as broadly defined, then Eisenstein's external
critique that some women find pornography (broadly defined) liberating would be stronger.
130. See supra notes 86-87, and MAcKINNON, THEORY OF THE STATE, supra note 35, at 115-16.
131. See CATHARINE A. MAcKINNON, Desire and Power, in FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra note 3,
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structure of sexual inequality, all heterosexual pleasure by women is
automatically defined away as the internalization of our oppression.
To suggest otherwise would be to suggest that there might be ambiguity
in psychology, that socially men may not be in total control of themselves, let
alone us. It would be to challenge the concept of human subjectivity which,
I believe, is the heart of MacKinnon's essentialism. I will return to this
argument.
C. Efficacy of Legislation
Eisenstein's argument goes to MacKinnon's broader political project.
Eisenstein is challenging MacKinnon's assertion that pornography broadly
defined is always the eroticization of the subordination of women, by showing
that some forms of erotica depict, and are experienced as, feminine
emancipation. To rewrite Eisenstein's argument within the language of my
analysis, even if one accepts (as I do) that pornography is continuous with
normal sex, this does not necessitate concluding that sexuality can only be
analyzed as gender hierarchy. Eisenstein, for example, suggests interpretations
of pornography's message other than subordination. 132 To put it yet another
way, if pornography is continuous with all sex, it is logically acceptable either
to analyze pornography as a subset of other forms of sexuality (such as erotic
feminine emancipation or romantic love) or to analyze sexuality as a subset
of pornography.
MacKinnon's political "theory of the state" and of pornography broadly
defined serve as her primary justification for regulating pornography.
MacKinnon argues that the regulation of pornography narrowly defined is part
of a larger project of eliminating pornography broadly defined leading to the
emancipation of biologically female persons. But then why should we regulate
only pornography narrowly defined?
When challenged on this point, MacKinnon changes tack and argues that
pornography narrowly defined should be subject to legislation because it is one
manifestation of misogyny, even if it is not the exclusive form of misogyny,
just as apartheid should be prohibited even though it is only one manifestation
of racism. The lessening of certain specific acts of violence against women can
function as a free-standing, fully sufficient, secondary argument for regulating
narrow pornography. It is this secondary argument which Sunstein adopts.
But this argument, which MacKinnon gives in defense of her proposal, is
at 49, 60.
132. Drucilla Cornell raises another possible alternate reading. MacKinnon concludes from the fact
that much violent pornography shows men oppressing women that men in fact have the power to oppress
women. Cornell (without in any way belittling the harm which violent pornography can have on women)
suggests that pornography can also reveal men as weak and castrated. "Who but a 'wimp' would fantasize
about sex with a woman in chains, tied, bound, and gagged, so he would, in the most profound sense, not
have to face her, let alone hear her?" Drucilla Cornell, Sexual Difference, supra note 2, at 2273.
[Vol. 5: 123
1992] Taming of the Shrew
a denial of the very heart of her powerful theoretical argument which dwells
on the primacy of pornography in our society. This is why, of course, Sunstein
focuses on it.
If pornography narrowly defined is only the top of the a pyramid of sexual
exploitation, MacKinnon must address directly how it is that merely making
it slightly more expensive to produce will substantially weaken the foundation
of pornography broadly defined. It is only relatively recently that pornography
narrowly defined has been readily available, yet misogyny (including sexualized
violence and violent sex) is embedded in Western civilization.," The printing
press, which allows written and other printed sexual material to be widely
distributed, is a relatively recent invention. Other forms of mass
communication, particularly the broadcast, video, and computer media, are
of course twentieth century developments. Doesn't this suggest that
pornography, narrowly defined, is historically a relatively small aspect of the
construction of sexuality? Why does MacKinnon believe that in contemporary
times pornography has displaced whatever mechanisms (perhaps infantile
psychological development in a patriarchal society? or religion?) have
historically been more significant? Why does she think that the fact that
pornography can be analyzed as the eroticization of dominance means that this
eroticization causes dominance as opposed to reflecting dominance constructed
by other mechanisms? 4
133. This point has been noted by some researchers on the effect of pornography. For example:
It is important, furthermore, to note that studies of sex crimes up to 1970 were conducted in
settings where porno-violence was relatively unusual. Hence it was too soon for evidence from
sex crime rates to be attributable to porno-violence .... It is only in the more recent past thatporno-violence has become generally accessible and found its way into more widely distributed
magazines such as Playboy and Penthouse... as well as pervading general release films. Hence,
evidence relating to pornography from the 1970s is much more pertinent than that derived from
the 1960s.
John H. Court, Sex and Violence: A Ripple Effect, in PORNOGRAPHY AND SEXUAL AoRESSION, supra
note 54, at 143, 149 (citations omitted). MacKinnon, in her critique of Marxism, notes that sexual violence
remains unchanged despite changes in economic relations. See MACKINNON, THEORY OF THE STATE, Supra
note 33, at 11. By referring to Western civilization, I do not mean to imply either that other cultures are
not misogynist or that American culture is particularly misogynist. As a Westerner I am speaking solely
about my own culture.
134. As I have written elsewhere, and as I shall continue to develop below, there is remarkable
resemblance between MacKinnon's analysis of pornography and the Christian analysis of sexuality. I would
suggest that in Western society, religion has a significant relationship with our sexual imagery-but it is
not clear, once again, whether this relationship is one of cause, effect, reflection, or all, or none of the
above.
One might be able to form an argument that Christian religious imagery in the Middle Ages and
Renaissance performed much of the function of eroticization of the hierarchy of violence which pornographyperforms in our more secular age. The iconography of the cult of the saints, as reflected in the sculptures
and windows of medieval churches (which were so decorated specifically to serve as the Bible of the
illiterate masses), was dominated by imagery of ecstasy through torture.
Catholic churches (particularly in Europe) are still filled with reliquaries in which teeth, bones, blood
and occasionally entire cadavers of saints are displayed to be venerated. If these grotesque icons havebecome less common today (reliquaries are now frequently displayed in museums for artistic or historic
appreciation rather than in churches for veneration), most Christian churches are still dominated by the
image of a bleeding, dead or dying, largely naked torture victim-the Crucifixion.
Christian imagery is associated, not only with violence, but with sexuality as well. Many of the virgin
saints (male as well as female) so hideously martyred were resisting rape or marriage. What is more,
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MacKinnon's argument is not one based on proximate causation between
any specific work of pornography with any specific act of sexual violence. To
understand the centrality of pornography, and indeed the definition and role
of pornography in MacKinnon's analysis, one must delve deeper into her
theory of personhood and sexuality. This theory identifies subjectivity in a
modern liberal way with autonomous, unconstrained individuality, and, in a
premodern Christian way, identifies sexuality with both loss of selfhood and
femininity. This leads inexorably to the rejection of sexuality in the form of
the disparagement of the feminine.
The power of MacKinnon's analysis, for me, flows precisely from the fact
that it accurately explicates the misogyny of traditional Western theories of
sexuality which underlie our legal system .13 The corresponding fundamental
weakness of her theory, however, may lie in her failure to recognize the
traditional nature of much of her analysis. Consequently, she risks merely
replicating, rather than critiquing, the very oppression she so desperately wants
to prevent.
IV. MACKINNON AND AUGUSTINE
A. Sexuality as Loss of Subjectivity in MacKinnon
Psychoanalytic theory tries to account for the observation that both men
and women tend to define the subject with the masculine, and negativity and
the object with the feminine. 136 Many feminists have emphasized this theory.
Christian mystics (like mystics in other religions) recognized the similarity of religious and sexual ecstasy.
Neo-platonic theology recognized sexual love as a shadow of the ideal form of love of God. Both rapture
and rape derive from the same Latin word, raptus, showing their related meanings. See Schroeder,
Abduction From the Seraglio, supra note 59, at 116 n.18.
In other words, the use of the same word, "passion," to describe both the sufferings of Christ and
the martyrs on the one hand, and sexual desire on the other, is not an interesting linguistic coincidence
or "Freudian slip." It reflects a fundamental Catholic doctrine. Having been raised as a Roman Catholic,
I am still simultaneously fascinated, exhilarated, and repelled by these images which capture the union of
the moment of the sublime and the moment of the grotesque which characterize both sex and religion.
135. As I have explained elsewhere, the misogyny of traditional Christianity is not a new feminist
overlay. The Doctors of the Church and medieval theologians were themselves expressly and admittedly
misogynist-they taught that not merely the subordination, but the degradation, of women was divinely
ordained as the curse of Eve. The institutions of marriage and motherhood were intended by God to be
humiliating and punishing to women. Consequently, the language used by traditional Christian theologians
to describe women and women's position sounds strikingly like the language used by contemporary
feminists. The difference is that the theologians thought they were describing a holy system and we think
we are describing an unjust system. Schroeder, Feminism Historicized, supra note 10, at 1136-47, 1189.
136. See, e.g., Schroeder, Abduction From the Seraglio, supra note 59, at 125-26 n.41, 134 n.57 and
196 n.274; Schroeder, Subject: Object, supra note 42, at 35 n.92, 52, 111-12. Other feminists who
emphasize the psychoanalytic theory of the subject as masculine include Drucilla Cornell and Judith Butler
in the United States, and Julia Kristeva and Luce Irigaray in France.
The so-called "different voice" school of feminism, represented in legal scholarship by Robin West,
Carrie Menkel-Meadows, and Leslie Bender, among others, also emphasize psychology, but rely on
American object-relations theory associated with Carol Gilligan and Nancy Chodorow, rather than
Continental psychoanalytic theory. I have criticized this approach elsewhere. See Schroeder, Feminism
Historicized, supra note 10, at 1137-51; Schroeder, Abduction From the Seraglio, supra note 59, at 124-51.
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In her analyses of pornography and abortion, however, MacKinnon does not
emphasize heterosexuality primarily as a psychoanalytic structure underlying
social systems. Rather, she expressly purports to approach the role of
heterosexual intercourse from a sociological or political standpoint, which
emphasizes group experience. She does not expressly address psychoanalysis
in the sense of individual experience. 37 But she does so in a way which is
strikingly similar to traditional Christian teachings on the role of sexuality,
particularly as explicated in the writings of St. Augustine of Hippo.
When I say that MacKinnon's theory of sexuality is deeply Christian, I am
not accusing her of attacking pornography or sexuality as morally
repugnant.3 3 Rather, as I shall explain, I mean that she adopts a theory
similar to that strain of traditional Christian theology that holds that involuntary
sexuality and subjectivity are mutually inconsistent in this society and that
identifies sexuality with the feminine.
I am also not suggesting that MacKinnon has studied and consciously
adopted the theories of the Fathers of the Church. I am suggesting, rather, that
there are striking parallels between her theory and Christian theology. This
should not be so surprising. MacKinnon is trying to analyze the sociology of
sexuality in contemporary America. I believe that it is self-evident that, to
date, Western Christianity has been the single greatest factor in the
development of American sexual behavior and attitudes. MacKinnon
should be congratulated, therefore, because her examination of American
sexuality has resulted in a description similar to that of the Christian theology
which underlies it. I would criticize her, however, for not recognizing the
similarity. Consequently, she risks embracing and reinstating, rather than
rejecting, the very theory which has arguably been the bulwark of the
137. I interpret Drucilla Cornell's critique of the attempt of some feminists to draw legal conclusions
from different voice theory as an unsuccessful, and perhaps naive, attempt to move directly and
unproblematically from psychological theory, which deals with individual experience, to sociology, which
deals with group experience. Accordingly, in her most recent work she has tried to integrate Niklas
Luhmann's theory of social systems with Lacanian psychoanalytic theory and Jacques Derrida's
deconstruction (which she has renamed the "philosophy of the limit"). See, e.g., Drucilla Cornell, The
Relevance of ime to the Relationship Between the Philosophy of the Limit and Systems Theory, 13
CARDozO L. REV. 1579 (1992), and DRUCILLA CORNELL, THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE LIMIT (1992).
MacKinnon can perhaps be criticized for making the reverse error. She examines the sociology and
politics of sexuality, then assumes that one can move directly and unproblematically to an explanation of
psychological experience.
138. MacKinnon repeatedly defends her theories against charges of moralism. See, e.g., CATHARINE
A. MAcKINNON, Afterword, in FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra note 3, at 147, 225. Rather, her similarity
to Augustine is that neither is concerned with the sinful nature of the sexual acts, but in the meaning of
sexuality.
Consequently, the reason why the religious right insisted on including an anti-pornography plank in
the Republican Party platform in 1992 may be based, not merely on moral approval, but on similarities
between the traditional Christian theology of sexuality and the theory underlying the regulation.
139. I state this as an empirical matter. It is not intended to denigrate other non-European and non-
Christian factors in American culture or to suggest that this state of affairs is good, bad, or indifferent.
I am merely stating that, rightly or wrongly, American culture has been dominated by Christianity and
Euro-centrism, The only way we can intelligently analyze American culture is to become more, not less,
familiar with the intellectual antecedents in Western culture so that we can recognize their unconscious
influence on us.
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oppression of women."'4
As I have stated elsewhere,"' although MacKinnon refuses to describe
clearly the positive vision of subjectivity which she believes women lack, this
vision can, however, be dimly glimpsed through her negative descriptions of
what is objectionable about the objectification of women. What MacKinnon
seems to be seeking is choice.'42 But MacKinnon does not seek choice as
mere voluntarism (in the sense of the ability or necessity of choosing between
two or more alternatives, albeit under constraints). Rather, she seems to seek
choice in the sense of "will."' 43 That is, she seeks pure unfettered autonomy
free from any and all restrictions, social, psychological or biological. Mere
voluntarism differs from the concept of will, in that if I act voluntarily, nobody
else makes me do something. In an act of will, even I do not make myself do
something. Rather I act autonomously, and perhaps even arbitrarily.'
Sexuality is central to MacKinnon's theory of subordination. This is not
because the physical, biological act of intercourse has any particular
significance. Rather, sexuality must be conceptualized in terms of the social
meaning given to it. " In this light, feminine sexuality can be seen as the
ultimate sign of women's lack of will: the lack of feminine subjectivity. This
is precisely because feminine sexuality is compelled and non-voluntary as a
social matter. The problem with heterosexuality for women is that it is not
chosen by us.'" Not only is heterosexuality mandatory in our society, "
140. I make a similar argument in Schroeder, Feminism Historicized, supra note 10, at 1187-89.
141. Schroeder, Abduction From the Seraglio, supra note 59, at 193-200.
142. Id. at 194-96, 269-72.
143. Probably the best description of this ultra-liberal concept of "free will" is contained in the
introduction to HEGEL'S, The Philosophy of Right. Hegel, of course, argues that this concept of free will
(which is similar to the conception of the autonomous individual who is the essential human being of liberal
philosophy) contains its own contradictions and must eventually be sublated into a richer and more complex
conception of human subjectivity which contains both moments of autonomous individuality and
communitarianism. See generally GEORG WILHELM FRIEDRICH HEGEL, THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT (T.
Know trans., 1967).
144. 1 thank my colleague Arthur Jacobson for this characterization.
145. See supra notes 34-42.
146. Realizing that women largely recognize themselves in sex-stereotyped terms, really do feel the
needs they have been encouraged to feel, do feel fulfilled in the expected ways, often actually
choose what has been prescribed, makes possible the realization that women at the same time
do not recognize themselves in, do not feel, and have not chosen this place.
MACKINNON, THEORY OF THE STATE, supra note 33, at 102. "The point is not how well women conform
to this standard but that there is such a standard and women do not create it." 1d. at 92. "Women, who
are not given a choice, are objectified; or rather, 'the object is allowed to desire, if she desires to be an
object.'" Id. at 140. "To be sexually objectified means having a social meaning imposed on your being
that defines you as to be sexually used, according to your desired uses, and then using you that way. Doing
this is sex in the male system." Id. at 140. "Women's complicity in their condition does not contradict
its fundamental unacceptability if women have little choice but to become persons who then freely choose
women's roles." Id. at 124. "Sexuality is to feminism what work is to marxism: that which is most one's
own, yet most taken away." Id. at 3. "To be deprived of control over work relations in marxism, over
sexual relations in feminism, defines each theory's conception of lack of power, per se." Id. at 4.
If one looks at liberal meanings of personhood through a feminist political analysis of what
pornography does to women, the inadequacy of the liberal dehumanization critique becomes clear.
In a feminist perspective, pornography dehumanizes women .... In the same act, pornography
dispossesses women of the same power of which it possesses men: the power of sexual, hence
gender, definition. The power to tell one who one is and the power to treat one accordingly.
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but women do not have effective control over specific individual acts of
heterosexual intercourse.1 48 Heterosexuality is figuratively thrust upon us,
just as men are literally thrust into us during heterosexual intercourse. Not only
can we not say no even if we want to, but also when we say yes, we are not
choosing; we are merely acquiescing to the inevitable. 49
Biologically female persons do not have "feminine" sexuality even as social
constructs; rather they become objects of male sexuality."' 0 That is,
MacKinnon imagines involuntary sexuality to be the antithesis of subjectivity.
As men are subjects, women as men's alterity must also be men's
sexuality.51 As described in Lacanian psychoanalytical terms, only men can
have the Phallus (be the desiring subject), women can merely be the Phallus
(be the object of desire of the desiring subject).152
Consequently, in this society women need abortion not so that we can gain
control over our bodies, but because in this society we have no control over
our sexuality. Or, more accurately, our sexuality is by definition not our
own. 5 3 If women are permitted to have abortions so that we may engage in
Perhaps a human being, for gender purposes, is someone who controls the social definition of
sexuality.
Id. at 209.
147. "What is it reasonable for a man to believe concerning a woman's desire for sex when
heterosexuality is compulsory?" Id. at 183. "Heterosexuality is its social structure, desire its internal
dynamic, gender and family its congealed forms, sex roles its qualities generalized to social persona,
reproduction a consequence, and control its issue." Id. at 3-4; see also id. at 178-79. Even homosexuality,
in a masculinist-heterosexual society, is seen to be a reaction to, and perhaps reflection of, heterosexuality.
Id. at 141-42.
148. See supra notes 57 and 61, and accompanying text, infra notes 159-63.
149. "Faced with no alternatives, the strategy to acquire self-respect and pride is: I chose it."
MACKINNON, THEORY OF THE STATE, supra note 33, at 150.
150. As in Christianity, women are seen as sex, made into sex. See Schroeder, Feminism Historicized,
supra note 10, at 1191-93. "Men define women as sexual beings; feminism comprehends that femininity
is sexual." MACKINNON, THEORY OF THE STATE, supra note 33, at 125. However, this does not mean
that there is such a thing as female sexuality. Rather, female sexuality is male sexuality objectified and
forced onto women. "Sexuality is to feminism what work is to marxism: that which is most one's own,
yet most taken away." Id. at 3. "[A] women [sic] is identified as a being who identifies and is identified
as one whose sexuality exists for someone else, who is socially male .... Considering women's sexuality
in this way forces confrontation with whether there is, in the possessive sense of 'women's, any such thing.
Is women's sexuality its absence?" Id. at 118. "Specifically, 'woman' is defined by what male desire
requires for arousal and satisfaction and is socially tautologous with 'female sexuality' and 'the female
sex.'" Id. at 131. "Women's sexuality is, socially, a thing to be stolen, sold, bought, bartered, or
exchanged by others. But women never own or possess it, and men never treat it, in law or in life, with
the solicitude with which they treat property .... The moment women 'have' it-'have sex' in the dual
gender/sexuality sense-it is lost as theirs." Id. at 172.
151. As I have argued elsewhere, and will return to below, traditional Roman Catholicism also teaches
that men symbolize the spirit and women the flesh, so that women are men's sexuality. Schroeder,
Feminism Historicized, supra note 10, at 1191-93.
152. GROSZ, supra note 101, at 118 (1990). In psychoanalytic theory the terms "man" and "woman"
are sexual positions individuals take up and are not synonymous with biologically male and female human
beings, respectively.
153. Sex does not look a lot like freedom when it appears normatively less costly for women to risk
an undesired, often painful, traumatic, dangerous, sometimes illegal, and potentially life-
threatening procedure than to protect oneself in advance. Yet abortion policy has never been
explicitly approached in the context of how women get pregnant; that is, as consequence of
intercourse under conditions of gender inequality; that is, as an issue of forced sex.
MAcKINNON, THEORY OF THE STATE, supra note 33, at 185-86. See also id. at 112-13, and CATHARINE
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more heterosexual intercourse, we would not be controlling our bodies." 4
Rather, we would be submitting to a sexuality which is not ours but which has
been constructed by others and forced upon us.'55 Women need abortion as
a remedy because sexuality-our understanding of and relationship to our
bodies-is involuntarily thrust upon us. Abortion, therefore, restores choice
by permitting women to reject the consequences of heterosexuality. It is a
rejection of sexuality as lack of choice. 56 By restoring choice, abortion helps
to construct subjectivity-make women into persons.'57 The issue of whether
abortion would be necessary, or ethically acceptable, in a society in which
there were sexual equality cannot be known at this time, and is irrelevant to
the issue of abortion in this society.' 58
MacKinnon's critique of the legal definition of rape, and indeed most areas
of liberal sex law, is similarly based on her analysis of women's lack of
control over sexuality.159 Criminal law distinguishes between rape and
A. MACKINNON, Privacy v. Equality, in FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra note 3, at 93, 94-96.
154. Even before Roe v. Wade, arguments for abortion under the rubric of feminism have
rested upon the right to control one's own body, gender neutral. This argument has been
appealing for the same reasons it is inadequate: socially, women's bodies have not been theirs;
women have not controlled their meanings and destinies. Feminists have tried to assert that
control without risking pursuit of the idea that something more than women's bodies might be
at stake, something closer to a net of relations in which women are gendered and unequal.
MACKINNON, THEORY OF THE STATE, supra note 33, at 189 (footnote omitted). Consequently, men often
support abortion rights because it makes women more available to men. Id. at 190.
155. "Similarly, when convenient to do away with the consequences of sexual intercourse (meaning
children), women get abortion rights. Women can have abortions so men can have sex." MacKinnon,
Reflections, supra note 38, at 1300.
156. "Abortion's proponents and opponents share a tacit assumption that women significantly control
sex. Feminist investigations suggest otherwise. Sexual intercourse, still the most common cause of
pregnancy, cannot simply be presumed coequally determined." MACKINNON, THEORY OF THE STATE,
supra note 33, at 184. "The abortion choice should be available and must be women's, but not because
the fetus is not a form of life. Why should women not make life-or-death decisions? The problem has been
that if the fetus has any standing in the debate, it has more weight than women do." Id. at 186.
157. "Now place the legal status of the fetus against the backdrop of women's tenuous to nonexistent
equality. Women have not been considered 'persons' by law very long; the law of persons arguably does
not recognize the requisites of female personhood yet." MacKinnon, Reflections, supra note 38, at 1315.
Short of achieving sexual and social equality-short of changing the context-abortion has offered
the only way out. However difficult an abortion decision may be for an individual woman, it
provides a moment of power in a life otherwise led under unequal conditions which preclude
choice in ways she cannot control. In this context, abortion provides a window of relief in an
unequal situation from which there is no exit.
Id. at 1317.
158. If authority were already just and body already autonomous, having an abortion would lose any
dimension of resistance to unjust authority or reclamation of bodily autonomy. Under conditions of sex
equality, I would personally be more interested in taking the man's view into account .... The privacy
approach might make more sense.
Id. at 1327.
159. The law on women's situation produced in this way views women's situation from the standpoint
of male dominance. It assumes that the conditions that pertain among men on the basis of
sex-consent to sex, comparative privacy, voice in moral discourse, and political equality on the
basis of gender-apply to women. It assumes on the epistemic level that sex inequality in society
is not real. Rape law takes women's usual response to coercion-acquiescence, the despairing
response to hopelessness to unequal odds-and calls that consent. Men coerce women; women
"consent".
MACKINNON, THEORY OF THE STATE, supra note 33, at 168.
19921 Taming of the Shrew
intercourse on the basis of consent. 1 ° But this incorrectly assumes that
women are ever capable of meaningful consent to heterosexual intercourse. 16'
The legal definition of consent in rape is designed so that most sexual assaults
do not fit within the definition. 1
62
For MacKinnon, meaningful consent is identified with the exercise of will
by a totally free and autonomous individual subject. Insofar as will is
constrained, voluntary action is, by definition, not consent. I would agree with
MacKinnon that women's lives and sexuality are extremely constrained in
masculinist society. 163 I would question, however, MacKinnon's implication
that constrained consent does not reflect sufficient voluntarism to make the
consent meaningful-that is, that it imposes no responsibility on the person
consenting. Indeed, if we are all socially constructed, how could any human
being ever be capable of the type of act of will which MacKinnon seeks? As
I have discussed elsewhere,'" and as I will return to shortly, despite
MacKinnon's ostensible rejection of objective truth, a liberal strain-an
essentialist conception of the subject-underlies her writings.
B. Sexuality as Loss of Subjectivity in Augustine
Sexuality plays as central a role in Augustine's theory of sin as it does in
MacKinnon's theory of subordination. It is the involuntariness of sex which
160. "Having defined rape in male sexual terms, the law's problem, which becomes the victim's
problem, is distinguishing rape from sex in specific cases. The adjudicated line between rape and
intercourse commonly centers on some assessment of the woman's 'will.'" Id. at 177. "The law, speaking
generally, defines rape as intercourse with force or coercion and without consent .... In a critique of male
supremacy, the elements 'with force and without consent' appear redundant. Force is present because
consent is absent." Id. at 172 (footnote omitted).
161. "If sexuality is relational, specifically if it is a power relation of gender, consent is a
communication under conditions of inequality." MACKINNON, THEORY OF THE STATE, supra note 33, at
182.
When sex is violent, women may have lost control over what is done to them, but absence of
force does not ensure the presence of that control. Nor under conditions of male dominance, does
the presence of force make an interaction nonsexual. If sex is normally something men do to
women, the issue is less whether there was force than whether consent is a meaningful concept.
Id. at 178. "Measuring consent from the socially reasonable, meaning objective man's, point of view
reproduces the same problem under a more elevated label." Id. at 181.
162. "The notion of consent here, the law's line between intercourse and rape, is so passive that a
dead body could satisfy it." MacKinnon, Reflections, supra note 38, at 1300.
163. Unlike MacKinnon, however, I also believe that men are constrained in masculinist society and
are not the free, willed, acting subjects described by MacKinnon. This is not to imply in any way that men
are not relatively more empowered than women in our society, that our legal system does not recognize
accurately either the relative difference in the degree of constraint imposed on men and women in our
society or the degree of constraint which exists in the average sexual encounter, or that our laws do not
need to be changed accordingly.
Specifically, I agree that it is bizarre to analyze abortion in terms of whether or not a woman, by
engaging in intercourse, is consenting to pregnancy, because such an analysis probably does not reflect
the conscious mental state of the women involved. In many, if not most, cases, such "consent" could only
be deemed "constructive consent," a legal fiction designed to justify a pre-existing conclusion, rather than
a finding of fact.
164. Schroeder, Abduction from the Seraglio, supra note 59, at 193-200; See generally Schroeder,
Subject:Object, supra note 42.
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concerns him. Sexuality is the ultimate sign of our lack of integrity-the
symbol of our imperfection.
As Peter Brown brilliantly explains in The Body and Society: Men, Women
and Sexual Renunciation in Early Christianity, 165 St. Augustine's contribution
to the Christian theology of sexuality was his reconceptualization of the
theological meaning of post-lapsarian sexuality.' Unlike many of the other
Church Fathers who emphasized sexuality in theology, Augustine did not see
a necessary rift between the spirit and the flesh. Earlier theologians taught
either that Adam and Eve did not have sexuality before the Fall, or that,
perhaps, their sexuality was different in that they did not experience sexual
love or pleasure.'67 In the Garden, these theologians speculated, Adam and
Eve lived together in an entirely rational, non-emotional, individualistic way
like angels. 68
In contrast, Augustine believed that humankind was created by God to be
social. 169  Marriage and childbearing are a necessary part of society.7"
Consequently, social love in the form of intimate friendship between Adam
and Eve,' 7' as well as physical pleasure in reproduction, were parts of the
165. PETER BROWN, THE BODY AND SOCIETY: MEN, WOMEN AND SEXUAL RENUNCIATION IN EARLY
CHRISTIANITY (1988) [hereinafter BROWN, THE BODY AND SOCIETY]. Brown traces the development of
the theory of sexuality in the early Church, carefully placing the writings of the Church Fathers in historical
and biographical context.
I rely primarily on two of St. Augustine's most familiar works, AUGUSTINE, THE CITY OF GOD
(Marcus Dods trans., 1950) [hereinafter AUGUSTINE, THE CITY OF GOD] and AUGUSTINE, CONFESSIONS
(R. Pine-Coffin trans., 1961) [hereinafter AUGUSTINE, CONFESSIONS].
166. Brown's book traces the development of the Christian concept of sexuality from its origins in
Jewish and Roman cultures, which accepted sexuality and emphasized the importance of the family in
religious life, to the Christian preoccupation with virginity. Augustine synthesized the theories of previous
theologians and created a theory that became the orthodox Christian theology of sexuality, which combined
both the Christian concept of celibacy and the Roman concept of society. BROWN, THE BODY AND SOCIETY,
supra note 165, at 387-427.
167. See, e.g., BROWN, THE BODY AND SOCIETY, supra note 165, at 94-96 and 294-96, and
Schroeder, Feminism Historicized, supra note 10, at 1190.
168. BROWN, THE BODY AND SOCIETY, supra note 165, at 399-400.
169. Since every man is a part of the human race, and human nature is something social and possesses
the capacity for friendship as a great and natural good, for this reason God wished to create all
men from one, so that they might be held together in their society .... And so it is that the
first natural tie of human society is man and wife.
AUGUSTINE, The Good of Marriage, in SAINT AUGUSTINE: TREATISES ON MARRIAGE AND OTHER
SuBJEcTS, in THE FATHERS OF THE CHURCH 9 (Charles T. Wilcox et. al. trans., & Roy J. Deferrari ed.,
1955) [hereinafter Augustine, Good of Marriage]. See also BROWN, THE BODY AND SOCIETY, supra note
165, at 400. As opposed to the early Christian ideal of the ascetic hermit who in solitude tried to achieve
individual spiritual perfection, Augustine's ideal was expressed in the title of his greatest work The City
of God, a holy community.
170. "A consequence is the union of society in the children who are the only worthy fruit, not of the
joining of male and female, but of sexual intercourse." Augustine, Good of Marriage, supra note 169, at
9. BRoWN, THE BODY AND SOCIETY, supra note 165, at 44)0-01.
171. BROWN, THE BODY AND SOCIETY, supra note 165, at 403. As I have argued elsewhere,
Augustine believed that reproduction, rather than friendship, was the primary reason for the creation of
woman. He thought it was self-evident that if God had intended to provide a companion for Adam primarily
for friendship or to help him work, He would have created a second man. Schroeder, Feminism
Historicized, supra note 10, at 1191-92.
Nevertheless, the friendship between husband and wife was, to Augustine, more significant than their
sexual relationship. "[B]ecause he came to the marriage when invited, there is merit in inquiring why it
is a good. This does not seem to me to be a good solely because of the procreation of children, but also
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original Creation, and therefore good. 72 Pre-lapsarian life in the Garden
differed from post-lapsarian life not in that the former was spiritual and the
latter fleshy, but that the former was one of unity and the latter of conflict.
In Eden, Adam and Eve's wills were totally in harmony with God's will,
they were totally in harmony with each other, and their flesh was totally in
harmony with their spirits.7 a Spirit and flesh, like man and woman, (which,
Christian theology taught, symbolize the spirit and the flesh, respectively) were
created to live in an unending harmonious conjugal embrace. 174 It is true that
this harmony, like the harmony of marriage, was one of hierarchy, with
spirit/man governing flesh/woman. But this hierarchy was based on mutual
love, devotion and complementarity, not on domination and subordination.
"For there could have been in both sexes, even without such intercourse, a
kind of friendly and genuine union of the one ruling and the other
because of the natural companionship between the two sexes." Augustine, Good of Marriage, supra note
169, at 12 (footnotes omitted) (Referring to Christ's recognition of marriage through attendance at the
wedding at Cana).
172. As man was created with both spirit and flesh, he was intended to experience both mental and
physical pleasure. "For neither was it a paradise only physical for the advantage of the body, and not also
spiritual for the advantage of the mind; nor was it only spiritual to afford enjoyment to man by his internal
sensations, and not also physical to afford him enjoyment through his external senses. But obviously it was
for both ends." AUGUSTINE, THE CITY OF GOD, supra note 165, at 458.
"[B]ut it is quite clear that they were created male and female, with bodies of different sexes, for the
very purpose of begetting offspring ... and it is great folly to oppose so plain a fact." Id. at 469. "And
it is by this original example, which God Himself instituted, that the apostle admonishes all husbands to
love their own wives in particular." Id. at 470.
Augustine argued that Adam and Eve "had been placed in Paradise for a probationary period, so that
they should learn to experience and to accept, with unswerving obedience and with open-hearted gratitude,
the full range of the joys of fully physical, fully social and ... fully sexual beings." BROWN, THE BODY
AND SOCIETY, supra note 165, at 400-01 (footnote omitted). Augustine, however, did think that Adam and
Eve would only be sexually active during the younger portion of their lives in order to have children.
Having performed this function, they would remain together in continent friendship when they were older.
That is, although Augustine thought that Adam and Eve felt sexual desire and this was proper, like other
Christian theorists, he was incapable of "articulating the possibility that sexual pleasure might, in itself,
enrich the relations between husband and wife." Id. at 402. See also id. at 400-02, 407, 417.
173. Augustine asks, and answers in the negative, the question "[11f our first parents had not sinned,
they would have had children in some other way, without physical coition, out of the munificence of the
almighty Creator, who was able to create them without parents ... ." Augustine, Good of Marriage, supra
note 169, at 10.
BROWN, THE BODY AND SOCIETY, supra note 165, at 405, 407. "Their love to God was unclouded,
and their mutual affection was that of faithful and sincere marriage; and from this love flowed a wonderful
delight, because they always enjoyed what was loved." AUGUSTINE, THE CITY OF GOD, supra note 165,
at 456.
174. "Adam and Eve had originally enjoyed a harmonious unity of body and soul. Their bodies had
followed the dictates of their wills with the same loving and familiar concord as they themselves had
followed the will of God." BROWN, THE BODY AND SOCIETY, supra note 165, at 405. He described the
relationship between body and soul as a "sweet marriage-bond." Id.
As happy, then, as were these our first parents, who were agitated by no mental perturbations,
and annoyed by no bodily discomforts, so happy should the whole human race have been, had
they not introduced that evil which they have transmitted to their posterity, and had none of their
descendants committed iniquity worthy of damnation; but this original blessedness continuing
until, in virtue of that benediction which said, "Increase and multiply," the number of the
predestined saints should have been completed, there would then have been bestowed that higher
felicity which is enjoyed by the most blessed angels ...
AUGUSTINE, THE CITY OF GOD, supra note 165, at 457.
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obeying." 175 The movements of Adam and Eve's sexual organs were subject
to the voluntary control of their spirits, just as the movements of our arms and
legs are today. 176 Their spirits were created to rejoice innocently in the
excellence and pleasure of their flesh acting in accordance with their will."7
The Fall was the moment of irreparable rift. 178 Adam and Eve separated
from God by turning their wills away from God's will. 79 This resulted in
disharmony not merely between God and man, but between man and man, man
and woman, and spirit and flesh."'
Sexuality and death are linked because they are the two ways in which the
rift between spirit and flesh (symbolizing as well the rift between God and
man, and between man and woman) are physically manifest: in death the spirit
is involuntarily deprived of its beloved spouse, flesh;' in sex, the spirit
loses its harmonious governance over the rebellious flesh. 8 2 Death comes
175. Augustine, Good of Marriage, supra note 169, at 9. See also, Schroeder, Feminism Historicized,
supra note 10, at 1151-52, 1163-64. (Hierarchy between men and women was a part of the original
creation, but the existing post-lapsarian hierarchy, whereby woman is subordinated to man against her will,
is a result of the Fall).
176. Do we now move our feet and hand when we will to do the things we would by means of
these members? do we meet with no resistance in them, but perceive that they are ready servants
of the will... and shall we not believe that, like as all those members obediently serve the will,
so also should the members have discharged the function of generation, though lust, the award
of disobedience, had been a wanting?
AUGUSTINE, THE CITY OF GOD, supra note 165, at 470-471. "The man, then, would have sown the seed,
and the woman received it, as need required, the generative organs being moved by the will, not excited
by lust." Id. at 472.
In such happy circumstances and general human well-being we should be far from suspecting
that offspring could not have been begotten without the disease of lust, but those parts, like all
the rest, would be set in motion at the command of the will; and without the seductive stimulus
of passion, with calmness and with no corrupting of the integrity of the body, the husband would
lie upon the bosom of his wife.
Id. at 475.
177. "No sadness of any kind was there, nor any foolish joy; true gladness ceaselessly flowed from
the presence of God, who was loved 'out of pure heart, and a good conscience, and faith unfeigned.' The
honest love of husband and wife made a sure harmony between them. Body and spirit worked harmoniously
together, and the commandment was kept without labour." AUGUSTINE, THE CITY OF GOD, supra note
165, at 474-75. "[T]he married intercourse of Adam and Eve, had this occurred before the Fall, would
have been an object lesson in the balanced rapture with which human beings might have used the physical
joys showered upon all by their creator." BROWN, THE BODY AND SOCIETY, supra note 165, at 407.
178. Or, more accurately, a rift which was irreparable by man alone, but Redeemable by Christ.
179. BROWN, THE BODY AND SOCIETY, supra note 165, at 416.
180. "They were beings estranged from Him and from each other as surely as their own sexual feelings
were now estranged from their own conscious selves." BROWN, THE BODY AND SOCIETY, supra note 165,
at 418. The disharmony between God and man necessitates the redemption of man by Christ's Incarnation,
Crucifixion, and Redemption.
The violence of society was also a result of the Fall. "Men and women had not fallen 'into' society
from an angelic state of Paradise; they had swept even society into their fall: 'Man . . . has become
antisocial by inner corrosion.'" (quoting Henry Chadwick) BROWN, THE BODY AND SOCIETY, supra note
165, at 405.
As I have described before, the rift between man and woman was thought to be manifest through the
deformation of the loving harmonious hierarchy of the Garden into the punishing hierarchy of domination
and subordination imposed upon Eve as her punishment in instigating the Fall. Schroeder, Feminism
Historicized, supra note 10, at 1151-52.
181. AUGUSTINE, THE CITY OF GOD, supra note 165, at 413-14, 416.
182. "But now the soul is ashamed that the body, which by nature is inferior and subject to it, should
resist its authority." AUGUSTINE, THE CITY OF GOD, supra note 165, at 471. "For the soul, revelling in
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to us at the end of our lives and we can try not to think about it. Sexuality,
on the other hand, is always with us.
Upon eating the fruit of the Tree of Knowledge of Good and Evil, Adam
and Eve "knew that they were naked."1 3 Augustine interpreted this not
merely as a recognition of their sexuality, but as a recognition of their
sexuality as something other than themselves.'" That is, immediately upon
his disobedience, Adam experienced an involuntary erection." 5  The
primordial parents saw this and felt sexual shame."' The measured, sober
emotion of social love in accordance with will, was replaced with
uncontrollable lust. The significance of sex was no longer merely biology, it
was its religious and social meaning.' 7
Involuntary sexual events such as erections, vaginal secretions,
menstruation, and wet dreams (not to mention spontaneous sexual desire and
erotic fantasies) continually attack both the young and the old-even the most
holy and chaste hermits and consecrated virgins.' 88 The horror of sex is
precisely that we do not choose it-our bodies constantly mock us with their
obscene humor.'89 God made post-lapsarian sex serve as a constant reminder
its own liberty, and scorning to serve God, was itself deprived of the command it had formerly maintained
over the body. And because it had wilfully deserted its superior Lord, it no longer held its own inferior
servant; neither could it hold the flesh subject, as it would always have been able to do had it remained
itself subject to God." Id. at 422. BROWN, THE BODY AND SOCIETY, supra note 165, at 407, 416-17.
183. Genesis 3:7.
184. Before the Fall, "'[Tihey were naked and were not ashamed;'-not that their nakedness was
unknown to them, but because nakedness was not yet shameful, because not yet did lust move those
members without will's consent; not yet did the flesh by its disobedience testify against the disobedience
of man." AUGUSTINE, THE CITY OF GOD, supra note 165, at 465.
185. BROWN, THE BODY AND SOCIETY, supra note 165, at 416. "They experienced a new motion
of their flesh, which had become disobedient to them, in strict retribution of their own disobedience to
God." AUGUSTINE, THE CITY OF GOD, supra note 165, at 422. "If the motion of concupiscence in the
unruly members of our first parents arose out of their sin, and only when the divine grace deserted them;
and if it was on that occasion that their eyes were opened to see, or, more exactly, notice their nakedness,
and that they covered their shame because the shameless motion of their members was not subject to their
will . . . ." Id. at 440.
186. BROWN, THE BODY AND SOCIETY, supra note 165, at 416. "For, as soon as our first parents
had transgressed the commandment, divine grace forsook them, and they were confounded at their own
wickedness; and therefore they took fig leaves ... and covered their shame; for though their members
remained the same, they had shame now where they had none before." AUGUSTINE, THE CITY OF GOD,
supra note 165, at 422.
187. "For the corruption of the body, which weighs down the soul, is not the cause but the punishment
of the first sin; and it was not the corruptible flesh that made the soul sinful, but the sinful soul that made
the flesh corruptible." AUGUSTINE, THE CITY OF GOD, supra note 165, at 444.
188. BROWN, THE BODY AND SOCIETY, supra note 165, at 406. Augustine was particularly tormented
by his personal inability to control his erections and nocturnal omissions after years of a celibate holy life.
AUGUSTINE, CONFESSIONS, supra note 165, at 234.
189. Not only lust, but impotence, is a mark of our lack of control:
But even those who delight in this pleasure are not moved to it at their own will, whether they
confine themselves to lawful or transgress to unlawful pleasures; but sometimes this lust
importunes them in spite of themselves, and sometimes fails them when they desire to feel it,
so that though lust rages in the mind, it stirs not in the body. Thus strangely enough, this emotion
not only fails to obey the legitimate desire to beget offspring, but also refuses to serve lascivious
lust; ... it is divided against itself ....
AUGUSTINE, THE CITY OF GOD, supra note 165, at 465. See also BROWN, THE BODY AND SOCIETY, supra
note 165, at 417.
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of our shame in our turning away from God.'" ° It is the badge of our sin.
By constantly thwarting our will, it shows us that the will which we thought
was so important that we (in the form of our primordial parents) preferred it
to the will of God is a pitiful, laughable illusion. 19'
Post-lapsarian sexuality serves even more specifically as the Christian
symbol of woman's degradation. This is appropriate insofar as Catholic
teaching is that although woman, as human being, is spiritual in that she was
created in the image of God, woman, as woman, symbolizes the flesh. 192 The
status of sexuality, therefore, is also always the status of woman.
As I have stated, before the Fall, Eve was inferior to Adam, but not
subjugated. She loved Adam through her free will and enjoyed her own
excellence, as a complement to his.'93 Eve, whose role was to follow, led
Adam in the Fall, thereby doubly sinning in her dual nature as both human
soul and female body. As a result, women were doubly cursed in our dual
sexuality as both lover and mother.' 94 We bear children in pain.' 95 We are
190. So that even "conjugal intercourse, sanctioned as it is by law for the propagation of children,
legitimate and honourable though it be" is always experienced as shameful:
Before the bridegroom fondles his bride, does he not exclude the attendants, and even the
paranymphs, and such friends as the closest ties have admitted to the bridal chamber? ... All
right actions wish to be set in the light, i.e. desire to be known. This right action, however, has
such a desire to be known, that yet it blushes to be seen .... And why so, if not because that
which is by nature fitting and decent is so done as to be accompanied with a shame-begetting
penalty of sin?
AUGUSTINE, THE CITY OF GOD, supra note 165, at 466-67.
191. Augustine called sexuality the poena reciproca. The human body served as a "tiny mirror, in
which men and women could catch a glimpse of themselves." BROWN, THE BODY AND SOCIETY, supra
note 165, at 418.
192. 1 discuss early Catholic theology of women more thoroughly in Schroeder, Feminism Historicized,
supra note 10. A brief, but excellent, introduction to this subject is Eleanor Commo MacLauglin, Equality
of Soul, Inequality of Sexes: Women in Medieval Theology, in RELIGION AND SEXISM: IMAGES OF WOMAN
IN THE JEWISH AND CHRISTIAN TRADITION, 213 (Rosemary R. Reuther ed., 1974). A controversial account
of the same is UTA RANKE-HEINEMANN, EUNUcHS FOR THE KINGDOM OF GOD: WOMEN, SEXUALITY,
AND THE CATHOLIC CHURCH (1990). This book received the gift of extraordinary pre-publication publicity
when John Cardinal O'Connor (without having read the book) condemned the book as "dirty" and
"preposterous." See Josh Getlin, Clashing with her Church, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 11, 1991, at El. With regard
to the latter work, I would note that I have frequently defended Ranke-Heinemann's work in conversation
from the charge that she is too angry with the Catholic Church with the "witticism" that it is impossible
for a woman to be too angry with the Church. However, the polemical tone of her writing is off-putting
and detracts from its persuasiveness.
193. Consequently, Augustine insisted on the dignity of the originally created female body and insisted
that the female saints would retain their femininity after the resurrection and would not, as some theologians
had suggested, be "rewarded" in heaven by being turned into men:
For my part, they seem to be wiser who make no doubt that both sexes shall rise. For there shall
be no lust, which is now the cause of confusion. For before they sinned, the man and the woman
were naked and were not ashamed .... And the sex of woman is not a vice, but nature. It shall
then indeed be superior to carnal intercourse and child-bearing; nevertheless the female members
shall remain adapted not to the old uses, but to a new beauty, which, so far from provoking lust,
now extinct, shall excite praise to the wisdom and clemency of God, who both made what was
not and delivered from corruption what He made.
AUGUSTINE, THE CITY OF GOD, supra note 165, at 839.
194. That is, Eve sinned both in her capacity as a human being by turning away from God, and in
her capacity as woman, by taking the active role by leading the man in the Fall.
Satan, through the serpent, chose to tempt Eve rather than Adam, because he realized that the superior
man could not be deceived, but the weaker woman could be. Adam was not even deceived by Eve. Rather,
he loved her so much, he knowingly chose to follow her to perdition, rather than being parted from her.
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now forcibly dominated by man, even as we are damned to desire man and
his domination.19 Both of these sexual roles were institutionalized as
marriage: the only permissible outlet for woman's sexuality. Postlapsarian
marriage was, consequently, conceptualized by the Church as being
intentionally degrading to women. It is the holy instrument of God's curse of
Eve. 197
MacKinnon's focus on sexuality, and her identification of sexuality with
the elimination of the personhood of women, is ultimately within this Christian
tradition. She identifies subjectivity with unconstrained will.19 She sees the
involuntariness of sexuality as thwarting of will. If sex is involuntary, then we
have no will, and we can not be the free standing individuals which we seek
to be. Sexuality, is therefore, a form of death-an involuntary destruction of
our personhood. To be a true person, one must make sex voluntary-freely
chosen at the deepest level.
C. How Sexuality Became Alienation
Of course, even if MacKinnon's conclusion that the involuntariness of sex
results in the loss of subjectivity is within the Christian tradition, MacKinnon
and Augustine explain the cause of this process differently.
Augustine was a theologian. He taught that we lost our true selves by
turning away from God. Our true will, our true selves, can only be achieved
by returning to God, by submitting our wills to God's will in order to re-
establish prelapsarian harmony. Mankind, with stunted wills, can not do this
alone. The harmony of God and man can only be established through Christ,
true man and true God.'" This will also eventually bring about the
He sinned in doing this because he was following his own will, and that of Eve's (and the serpent's) rather
than the will of God.
And Adam was not deceived, but the woman being deceived was in the transgression;" but he
speaks thus, because the woman accepted as true what the serpent told her, but the man could
not bear to be severed from his only companion, even though this involved a partnership in sin.
He was not on this account less culpable, but sinned with his eyes open.
AUGUSTINE, CrrY OF GOD, supra note 165, at 459 (quoting St. Paul). See also, Schroeder, Feminism
Historicized, supra note 10, at 1156.
In contradistinction, some theologians suggested that because of Eve's inferior nature, her action in
the Fall was not as heinous as Adam's. That is, if Adam had not followed Eve, woman might have been
punished, but mankind might not have been damned. Id. at 1193 n.217.
195. "I will greatly multiply your pain in childbearing; in pain you shall bring forth children.
Genesis 3:16.
196. "[Y]et your desire shall be for you husband, and he shall rule over you." Genesis 3:16.
197. Schroeder, Feminism Historicized, supra note 10, at 1163-64. The Catholic Church has recently
rejected the traditional view that the subordination of woman is the divinely ordained curse of Eve. God's
words in Genesis are now interpreted not as a curse but as God's prediction of the debased nature of human
life in the state of sin. The subordination of woman is an evil which humans should fight to overcome in
the same way as we fight to overcome the other evils predicted in this passage (which include snakebite,
hard labor and death). See Peter Steinfels, Anger and Praise Follow Pope's Letter on Women, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 2, 1988, § 1, at 8 (referring to John Paul 11's Apostolic Letter "On the Dignity of Women").
198. Of course, in the Christian story, free will, unconstrained by sin, would always be in perfect
accord with God's will.
199. AUGUST1NE, THE CYry OF GOD, supra note 165, at 346-47.
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reestablishment of the harmony between flesh and spirit in the bodily
resurrection of the Last Judgment.2°
MacKinnon would, of course, substitute societal structures for divine
Creation. She believes that her social construction theory shows that biological
determinism is a misconception.2 1 Rather than sexuality being our religious
understanding of the flesh, however, it is our social understanding of biology
and gender.2 2 As a human invention, therefore, sexuality is by definition
artificial.
D. Male Subjectivity
MacKinnon takes a further step which is not necessitated by her analysis,
and, indeed, might be antithetical to her expressed theory of social
construction. She seems to suggest from her observation that the biological
aspect of the flesh does not pre-ordain any specific social order of sex, that
the flesh cannot serve as any meaningful constraint on sex in this society. How
then can she account for the involuntariness (i.e. constraining aspect) of sex,
without God or nature and at the same time preserving the concept of human
will?
She does this by distinguishing between the personhood and effective will
of man and woman, and by adopting what seems to be an instrumental
conception of psychology which leaves no room for the unconscious.2 3 That
is, her concept of subjectivity and will requires some human being to
experience and wield will. She concludes that men, as a social class, have will.
She then can explain women's lack of will as the result of men's will to power.
Women's involuntary sexuality is voluntarily imposed by men acting as a class.
MacKinnon can be seen, therefore, to overlay a postmodern concept of the
subject as a social construct upon a combination of a premodern conception
of the flesh and a "merely" modern concept of an autonomous acting subject.
MacKinnon's discovery that there is no inherent feminine sexuality is not
based merely on the post-modernist cliche that there is no objective reality "out
there." Rather, she not only notes that sexuality is socially constructed, she
finds it necessary, and meaningfid, to ask who does the constructing and of
what sexuality is constructed.2 4
By asking these questions, however, MacKinnon reveals that she is
rejecting, rather than accepting, a postmodern theory of the social construction
200. Only Jesus and the Virgin Mary embodied harmony between the flesh and the Spirit. As her titles
"The Immaculate Conception" and "Alone ofAll Her Sex" imply, Mary alone was free from Original Sin
from the moment of her conception. Consequently she never experienced the disjunction of body and soul
which plagues all other mortals. BRowN, THE BODY AND SocIETY, supra note 165, at 407. See generally
MARINA WARNER, ALONE OF ALL HER SEX: THE MYTH AND CULT OF THE VIRGIN MARY (1976).
201. See note 34, supra.
202. See notes 34-42, supra.
203. See text at notes 136-37 and 150-52, supra.
204. See note 39, supra. MACKINNON, THEORY OF THE STATE, supra note 33, at 131.
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of sexuality. That is, MacKinnon's theory, like liberalism and marxism,
presupposes a pre-existing acting subject. But Michel Foucault's theory is
precisely that no one constructs sexuality-power lacks an acting subject."°'
Similarly, asking what sex is constructed from presupposes a pre-existing
authentic sexuality which can be distorted. 2 6 Foucault, consequently, argued,
as I do, that combining concepts of power being wielded by an active subject
(whether conceived in the liberal concept of individuals, the marxist concept
of classes or the feminist concept of genders) with authentic sexuality
inevitably leads to a liberal Romantic/Christian theory of sexuality.2 7
MacKinnon's concept of will, a modern theory of the subject, requires that
someone be doing the constructing. Consequently, to MacKinnon, her
observation that men are socially advantaged by the sexual hierarchy is
demonstration that men are in control of sexuality and are imposing sexuality
on women.
208
One of the interesting things about MacKinnon is that even though she
gives no account of the unconscious she seems, at first blush, to come to the
same conclusion as Lacan: The Woman doesn't exist.2' That is, the subject
is always psychologically identified with the masculine, and the feminine with
the absence of subjectivity.21° Women are the object of male subjectivity.
205. That is, Foucault argued that the modem (i.e. liberal or marxist) concept of the subject was dead.
While there can be victims of domination, there are no perpetrators. Charles Taylor, Foucault on Freedom
and Truth, in FOUCAULT: A CRtrrIcAL READER 69, 75-76, 83-84, and 90-91 (David C. Hoy ed., 1986).
Foucault's targets particularly included marxism. Id. at 85.
206. Id. at 78.
207. Id. at 77-79 and 83-84.
208. See text accompanying notes 146-51, supra.
209. That is Woman with a capital "W," the Feminine:
If women are socially defined such that female sexuality cannot be lived or spoken or felt or even
somatically sensed apart from its enforced definition, so that it is its own lack, then there is no
such thing as a woman as such; there are only walking embodiments of men's projected needs.
Under male supremacy, asking whether there is, socially, a female sexuality is the same as asking
whether women exist.
MACKINNON, THEORY OF THE STATE, supra note 33, at 119.
For excellent introductions to Lacanian theory, see GROsz, supra note 101, and JACQUES LACAN AND
THE ECOLE FREUDIENNE, FEMININE SEXUALrrY (Juliet Mitchell & Jacqueline Rose eds., & Jacqueline Rose
trans., 1982). Drucilla Cornell has also published several articles containing insightful, albeit idiosyncratic,
accounts of Lacanian theory. See, e.g., Cornell, Sexual Difference, supra note 2; DRUCILLA CORNELL,
BEYOND ACCOMMODATION: ETHnCAL FEMIISM, SExuAL DIFFERENCE AND THE LAW (1991) [hereinafter
CORNELL, BEYOND ACCOMMODATION]; Drucilla Cornell, The Doubly-Prized World Myth, Allegory, and
the Feminine, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 644 [hereinafter Cornell, Doubly Prized Workd]; and Drucilla Cornell
& Adam Thurshwell, Femininity, Negativity, Intersubjectivity, 5 PRAXIS INT'L 484 (1986). Also of interest
is the work of Lacanian-heretic, Luce Irigaray. LUCE IRIGARAY, SPECULUM OF THE OTHER WOMAN
(Gillian C. Gill trans., 1985).
Of course, I, not MacKinnon, am drawing this similarity between her thought and Lacanianism. I do
not believe MacKinnon ever cites Lacan (except in the passing reference cited supra note 39) or Kristeva
(she does cite Irigaray, but not for this point).
210. And so, Grosz describes Lacan's analysis of what it might mean when a woman says "I" when
subjectivity is associated in the symbolic of our conciousness with the masculine.
In so far as she speaks and says 'I', she too must take up a place as a subject of the symbolic;
yet, in another, in so far as she is positioned as castrated, passive, an object of desire for men
rather than a subject who desires, her position within the symbolic must be marginal or tenuous:
when she speaks as an 'I' it is never clear that she speaks (of or as) herself. She speaks in a
mode of masquerade, in imitation of the masculine, phallic subject. Her 'I', then, ambiguously
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On second look, however, one can see that her lack of a sophisticated
psychological theory and loyalty to classical liberal conceptions of individuality
cause her to interpret this in a literal-minded way.
MacKinnon argues not merely that society has the power to make ideas into
reality, but that our ideas are our reality. " When Jacques Lacan said that
psychologically we imagine the subject as masculine and the feminine as lack,
he is talking about the myths that inhabit our psyches. He meant that all human
beings experience the "castration experience" as infants when we realize that
we are not one with the Phallic Mother." 2 The "Phallus" is the term for the
symbolic object of desire. 23 Psychologically we conflate the fact that male
human beings have penises with the idea that men possess the Phallus-i.e.
have subjectivity.2 4 In contrast, women can only symbolically be the
Phallus-the object of desire. But, to Lacan no human being can ever regain
the Phallic Mother who is lost in the Infantile Imaginary.2"' No man ever
achieves his desire, no woman can ever satisfy his desire. The more a woman
seeks to satisfy male desire, to become the object of desire, the more she is
objectified and loses her individualized subjectivity. She is seen, and
experiences herself, as lack.21 6
This psychoanalytic and linguistic error has tragic psychological
consequences for both men and women. 217 Feminists influenced directly by
her position as a (pale reflection of the) masculine subject; or it refers to a 'you', the (linguistic)
counterpart of the masculine 'I'.
GROSZ, supra note 101, at 71-72.
Lacan's concept of the subject is not the autonomous freestanding individual of liberal philosophy.
Rather it is the psychoanalytical concept of the ego, which only exists in symbolic relation to the other.
That is, subjectivity is always intersubjectivity. The development of the subject is one of the primary topics
of Lacan's first seminar. See generally LACAN, FREUD'S PAPERS ON TECHNIQUE, supra note 101, and
JACQUES LACAN, THE FOUR FUNDAMENTAL CONCEPTS OF PSYCHO-ANALYSIS (Jacque-Alain Miller ed.
& Alan Sheridan trans., 1977).
211. See text at note 47, supra. MACKINNON, THEORY OF THE STATE, supra note 33, at 125.
Consequently, one of the reasons why she thinks that group defamation is an inadequate way of analyzing
pornography is that truth is a defense to defamation. The power of pornography is that it can make its lies
empirically true; it says women are non-human, and then dehumanizes them. MacKinnon, Defamation and
Discrimination, supra note 3.
212. Cornell, Doubly Prized World, supra note 209, at 660-61.
213. See JACQUES LACAN, ECRITS, A SELECTION 285-91 (Alan Sheridan trans., 1977).
214. The feminine, which is psychologically identified with the lost Phallic Mother, can only be
experienced as lack. Consequently, "Woman" (i.e. the feminine) "does not exist" (i.e. is experienced as
lack).
215. Cornell, Doubly Prized World, supra note 209, at 662.
216. This specifically describes the "narcissistic" woman. Lacan's theory tries to explain why men
and women so often love out of phase-they are both fighting over the same "thing." As men seek to
acquire the woman-phallus, they are always disappointed. Insofar as the loving man tries to fill his woman's
lack and give her the Phallus by giving her the penis in intercourse, he experiences lack and the symbolic
loss of his penis. He turns from the woman. In turn, intercourse is always also a disappointment to women
because it makes apparent that the penis is no substitute for the Phallus. Her lack will never be filled and
she desires even more. Grosz gives a brief synopsis of the Lacanian analysis of typical sexual relations
at GROSZ, supra note 101, at 115-46.
217. Especially insofar as psychoanalytic theory, which sees sexuality as a linguistic construct which
is constructed in infancy in the mirror and oedipal stages and which is incorporated in our very ability to
speak and understand language, risks seeming to be inevitable (if not biological). However, as Elizabeth
Grosz explains, at closer reading Lacan's theory does not explain the origin of patriarchy. It presupposes
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Lacan, such as Judith Butler, Drucilla Cornell, Elizabeth Grosz, Luce Irigaray
and Julia Kristeva, explore what it could mean to write an affirmative myth
of the feminine as subject, as something other than lack, from this psycho-
linguistic starting point.218
MacKinnon, in contradistinction, does not see male subjectivity as
psychoanalytical myth-making. Masculinity has the power to make its myth
into reality.2 19 Men really do have the Phallus, and Women really are the
Phallic Mother. She says that in masculinist society, only men can become true
human beings.22° Women are not merely treated as unequal, they are actually
made into non-persons. 221 How?
As we have seen, the ultimate symbol of personhood (as in Augustinian
theory) is control over sexuality; the ultimate symbol of non-personhood is to
be controlled by sexuality. MacKinnon says so expressly. "Perhaps a human
being, for gender purposes, is someone who controls the social definition of
it as an existing social system and at most tries to explain its reproduction. Consequently, Lacanian theory
suggests the possibility of change. GRosz, supra note 101, at 69. I read Grosz's analysis (developed
through her reading of Iragaray) as saying, in effect, that Lacanian theory is a theory of language and
psychoanalysis and not a theory of anatomy which can be empirically verified. It is a story we tell about
ourselves. Its "truth" resides in its explanatory power. But, it is a story told by men, and is not necessarily
the only possible "true" story which can be told.
218. This is the concern of those feminists who have been influenced by Continental psycho-linguistic
theory including JUDITHBUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE: FEMINISMAND THE SUBVERSION OF IDENTITY (1990),
Cornell, Sexual Difference, supra note 2, CORNELL, THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE LIMtT, supra note 137,
CORNELL, BEYOND ACCOMODATION, supra, note 209, Cornell, Doubly-Prized World, supra, note 209,
GRoSZ, supra note 101, and IRIGARAY, supra note 209.
219. See note 36, 40 and 64, supra. "Women's sexualness, like male prowess, is no less real for being
mythic. It is embodied." MACKINNON, THEORY OF THE STATE, supra note 33, at 123.
220. "[W]omen are in fact not full people in the sense men are allowed to become." Id. at 103.
If a woman feels anger at not being treated as a full person, this surely refers to social definitions
of personhood, possibly even liberal ones, to which men routinely experience entitlement without
being subjected to class-based critique. Similarly, feelings of loss of control over one's life may
reflect a social standard of self-actualization that requires control as a means to it.
Id. at 52.
It becomes clear, from one horror story after another, that men's position of power over women
is a major part of what defines men as men to themselves, and women as women to themselves.
Challenge to that power is taken as a threat to male identity and self-definition. Men's reaction
of threat is also a challenge to women's self-definition, which has included supporting men,
making men feel masculine, and episodically being treated better as a reward.
Id. at 92.
221. "[Wlomen are systematically deprived of a self and... that process of deprivation constitutes
socialization to femininity." Id. at 89.
"It is only to the extent that each of these values [i.e. self-respect and avoidance of pain] is socially
accepted as human within a given culture that their negation becomes a quality of sex and is eroticized in
and as 'woman'. . . . In this way, women's sexuality as expressed in pornography precisely negatives her
status as human." Id. at 210-11.
Yale Journal of Law and Feminism
sexuality."' Women, MacKinnon argues, are involuntarily subjected to
heterosexuality and are dehumanized. Insofar as men are benefitted by the
sexual hierarchy, and insofar as society is a construction of human subjectivity,
men as subjects must be creating sexuality to continue their own status.
Perhaps the most pervasive realization of consciousness raising was that
men as a group benefit from these same arrangements by which women
are deprived. Women see that men derive many advantages from
women's roles . . . .But the major advantage men derive, dubious
though it may seem to some, is the process, the value, the mechanism
by which their interest itself is enforced and perpetuated and sustained:
power. Power in its social male form. It is not only that men treat
women badly, although often they do, but that it is their choice whether
or not to do so.223
Consequently, if men are subjects, they must control sex. Sexuality is,
therefore, seen to be voluntary to men, and imposed by men upon women.
A theory of sexuality becomes feminist methodologically, meaning
feminist in the post-marxist sense, to the extent it treats sexuality as a
social construct of male power: defined by men, forced on women, and
constitutive of the meaning of gender. 4
By voluntarily imposing their sexual will upon women, men constitute their
subjectivity by objectifying women. 2' As MacKinnon so eloquently explains,
"Man fucks woman; subject verb object."" 26
Having conceptualized feminine sexuality as objectification through
imposition of masculine sexuality by male subjects, MacKinnon needs a
mechanism to perform this function. As we have seen, she does not explore
psychoanalytic theory which traces this process to early childhood, probably
because such a theory does not recognize any consciously acting agent. Rather,
her theory of pornography serves this purpose. Pornography is defined as the
eroticization of gender hierarchy, and therefore the means of construction of
222. The context of this quote is:
[T]o say that pornography is "dehumanizing" is an attempt to articulate its harm. But "human
being" is a social concept with many possible meanings . . . In a feminist perspective,
pornography dehumanizes women in a culturally specific and empirically descriptive-not liberal
moral-sense. In the same act, pornography dispossesses women of the same power of which
it possesses men: the power of sexual, hence gender, definition. The power to tell one who one
is and the power to treat one accordingly. Perhaps a human being, for gender purposes, is
someone who controls the social definition of sexuality.
Id. at 209.
223. Id. at 93-94.
224. Id. at 128.
225. Id. at 121-25.
226. Id. at 124.
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sexuality; i.e. the sexuality constructed is defined as the dominance of men and
the subordination of women. If we wish to maintain a belief that some humans
have subjectivity in the sense that sex must be voluntary, and if men are
advantaged by the sexual status quo, it seems to follow that pornography must
be the masculine will to power. For women to achieve subjectivity, therefore,
they must destroy the mechanism of the masculine will to power-they must
gain control of, and destroy, pornography.
V. REWRITING THE FEMININE
And so we see, MacKinnon's theory of pornography is based on a
premodern (Christian) concept of sexuality as the symbol of our lack of
subjectivity, combined with a modern concept of the subject as the
autonomous, freely-acting individual capable of exercising will, and a
postmodern concept of the self as a social construct. That is, the flesh robs us
of our selfhood because it is involuntary, but humans are self-actuating
individuals who act according to free will, but we are all social constructs.
Pornography is seen as the necessary linchpin which connects these three very
different dimensions: men, acting as free subjects use pornography to construct
and impose sexuality upon women, thereby robbing women of their
subjectivity. This necessitates a tautologous notion of pornography and
sexuality which conflates all sexual discourse and acts with the annihilation of
the personhood of woman. All intercourse must be rape, all love must be hate,
all erotica and romance must be pornography. Eros and Thanatos are seen not
merely as twins, but as one and the same. The personhood of woman can,
therefore, only be conceived as the political act of the destruction of sexuality
through the control of its constructing mechanism-pornography.
The lack of a potential positive image of the female self2" and the stark
bi-polar duality of masculine subjectivity and feminine objectification make the
possibility of an affirmative feminist program problematic, to say the least.
Because she sees politics totally as power of one group over the other, her
program often seems to devolve into reversing the structure of gender
hierarchy. Drucilla Cornell has very tellingly referred to MacKinnon's theory
as the "politics of revenge. "228
It is very hard to see how this reversal and revenge is to be achieved. If
pornography is continuous with all sexual discourse in masculinist society, if
rape is continuous with all heterosexual intercourse, such a strategy risks
devolving into total silence. Without a positive conception of the feminine,
227. As I have written elsewhere, I believe that MacKinnon does implicitly have an affirmative liberal
agenda, despite her repeated denials. But she does not rely on an essentialist concept of "the feminine."
Rather, she has an essentialist concept of "the human," which seems to correspond to the liberal concept
of the human, (i.e. autonomous individuality) which is also the current stereotype of the masculine.
Schroeder, Abduction From 7he Seraglio, supra note 59, at 193-200.
228. CORNELL, BEYOND ACCOMMODATION, supra note 209, at 11.
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MacKinnon's unmodified feminism degenerates into total annihilation. It is an
annihilation of the feminine as well as the masculine, as the feminine is seen
as merely a creation of the masculine. What is more, the politics of revenge,
without a politics of creation, is merely a recognition of the power of the status
quo.
In this view, MacKinnon's very critique of pornography is a constant
reaffirmation of its power; an unending rewriting of the myth of male
subjectivity. A negative program reconstitutes the status quo by denying it
without offering alternatives. MacKinnon's program reconstructs masculinity
as dominance and femininity as subordination by playing express homage to
the awesome and terrifying power of the penis. In the words of Zillah
Eisenstein, "To equate sex and gender in [MacKinnon's] fashion ... is to let
the phallus win."229 A deconstruction of masculinism and reconstruction of
sexuality requires more than MacKinnon's recognition of the power of
masculinity, and the denial of sexuality. It requires the positive, contradictory,
and impossible task of rewriting the feminine-and with it, the masculine.
Consequently, while MacKinnon starts as one of the most powerful
prophetesses of the cycle of the oppression of women, she is ultimately unable
to break out of that cycle. She has defined away her own feminine voice as
silence.
And so, Cass Sunstein did not need to inoculate masculinism against
"feminism unmodified," because it is not a deadly virus like AIDS or small
pox-it is merely the common cold. He cannot congratulate himself for taming
the shrew.
229. EISENSTEIN, supra note 127, at 172.
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